



Stabilisation Unit

# Analysis for Conflict and Stabilisation Interventions

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*What Works Series*

Stabilisation Unit

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## Table of Contents

Introduction.....	3
Executive Summary .....	5
Background.....	5
Section One: The Importance of Analysis in Supporting Stabilisation Interventions.....	7
Why is analysis a requirement in a stabilisation environment?.....	7
How analysis relates to the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes....	8
Section Two: Approaches to Analysis .....	8
General Approaches to Analysis.....	8
The UK Approach to Analysis in Conflict and Stabilisation.....	9
Section Three: Other Analytical Frameworks For Conflict, Governance and Stability .....	13
Section Four: Case Studies (Afghanistan and Sudan) .....	19
Conclusions.....	26
Annex 1: Generic Analytical Tools .....	27
1. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)	
2. Instruments of Power	
3. Stakeholder Analysis	
4. CAGE (Cultural, Administrative, Geographical and Economic) Distance Framework	
5. Cultural Analysis	
6. Delphi Technique	
7. Scenario Planning	
8. Critical Path Analysis	
9. International Political Economy Analysis	
Annex 2: Generic Terms of Reference for a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS)....	32
Bibliography and Resources .....	36

## Acronyms

AU	African Union
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CAGE	Cultural, Administrative, Geographic and Economic
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (DFID)
CGA	Country Governance Analysis
CGCA	Country Governance and Conflict Analysis
CPRD	Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic
CSO	Civil Society Organisation, also Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (US State Department)
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
ICAF	International Conflict Assessment Framework
JACS	Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Security Council
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
PCRU	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (predecessor to SU)
PE	Political Economy
PEST	Political, Economic, Social and Technological
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters (UK)
PRAP	Participatory Rural Appraisal Process
SADC	Southern African Development Community
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada)
SU	Stabilisation Unit
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WGA	World Governance Assessment

## Introduction

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is an integrated civil-military operational unit which reports to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings. It ensures lessons from practical experience are captured as best practice and used to improve future delivery by Her Majesty's Government (HMG).

The purpose of this "What Works" Series paper is to provide practical advice about conflict, stabilisation, security and justice activities with examples, evidence and tools, consistent with HMG's engagement on stabilisation and wider aspects of working in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). It draws on what the SU has learned to date and is primarily designed for programme staff in country offices, project implementers, deployed SU staff and Deployable Civilian Experts (DCEs), and stabilisation practitioners generally. It is not a formal statement of HMG policy.

This paper<sup>1</sup> focuses on the important role that analysis plays in defining, shaping, designing and monitoring interventions funded by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF).<sup>2</sup> It is meant to provide readers with a general background on analysis, as well as contextualised analytical approaches in support of stabilisation planning. Whilst reference is made to a number of bilateral and multilateral analytical approaches used in the field today, focus is given to HMG's current analytical framework supporting conflict and stabilisation – the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS).

Readers should use this paper to familiarise themselves with the process of analysis, as well as the specific frameworks used by the UK and its partners in supporting work in the area of conflict and stability. In overviewing the main methodologies, and their various elements, the paper also provides guidance on key processes supporting analysis, such as, for example, in developing a Terms of Reference (ToR) for a commissioned analysis, or in developing a team to lead an analytical exercise. As analysis is undertaken in many different contexts, and shaped by many different dynamics, readers should remain flexible in terms of tailoring the methodology and process to the requirement on the ground. Two case studies are provided which detail the approach taken and the lessons identified, from two very different analytical

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been written by Professor Ann Fitzgerald on behalf of the Stabilisation Unit.

<sup>2</sup> Announced in June 2013, for FY 2015-16 and as a successor to the Conflict Pool, the £1 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) pools new and existing resources across Government to prevent conflict and tackle threats to UK interests that arise from instability overseas. The National Security Council (NSC) will set priorities for the Fund, drawing on the most effective combination of defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence.

experiences supporting stabilisation interventions. This paper should be read alongside three other papers in the “What Works” Series, on [Analysis](#), [Planning](#), and [Monitoring and Evaluation](#). An Issues Note (IN) on [Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation](#) draws together the key thematic issues across the papers and puts programmatic considerations into a wider and longer term context relevant to fragile and conflict-affected states.

### **Stabilisation Unit Publications**

The Stabilisation Unit produces a number of publications in order to inform key stakeholders about a range of topics relating to conflict, stability, security and justice. The publications can be found at our new [Publications web page](#).

A brief introduction to the different series and existing titles is below.

#### **Stabilisation Series**

Core guidance on the UK perspective on stabilisation; how it should be delivered.

[The UK Approach to Stabilisation \(2014\)](#)

[The UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes](#)

[Security Sector Stabilisation](#)

#### **Issues Note Series**

Short papers aimed at policy makers, programme managers and deputy heads of mission to inform them about key issues in thematic areas.

[Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation](#)

#### **What Works Series**

These are long paper intended for programme managers, project officers and deployees. They include detailed tools and frameworks that can be applied to thematic or programmatic areas.

[Policing the Context](#)

[Analysis](#)

[Planning](#)

[M&E](#)

#### **Deployee Guide Series**

Practical guidance intended for first time or seasoned deployees.

[United Nations Missions](#)

[EU CSDP](#)

[Military Headquarters](#)

[OSCE](#)

Feedback can be sent to the SU Lessons Team at: [SULEssons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk](mailto:SULEssons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk).

## Executive Summary

Analysis is an important part of planning for stabilisation interventions. It provides the foundation – through data and evidence – for the overall stabilisation approach. In the revised [UK Approach to Stabilisation](#), stabilisation is defined as: “... one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability”.

In the new [UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes](#), analysis underpins the following five principles:

- Work within the political context;
- Integrate and coordinate appropriately;
- Plan systematically;
- Analyse continually;
- Engage broadly.

Over the past two decades, models and frameworks supporting the separate but related fields of conflict, stability and governance analysis have been developed. More recently, these frameworks have been further developed to recognise the interdependent nature of the many dynamics within the conflict, governance and stabilisation domains – a development which has also emphasised the importance of an effective “process” to support any given analytical framework.

Coherent approaches to undertaking analysis has become critical for shaping cross-government decision-making and programmes. The UK Government has built on its conflict, governance, humanitarian and stabilisation experience to date and developed the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework. The JACS offers a process within which both JACS analytical tools and/or a number of other existing analytical frameworks can be applied.

Case studies in Afghanistan and Sudan identify important lessons for future stabilisation analyses.

## Background

Analysis can be described as a detailed examination of the elements or structure of an issue or problem, or the basis for discussion or interpretation. In the context of planning, analysis becomes an essential element of the planning process and seeks to address the present, future and emerging issues of a given context - regional, country, or local.

Analysis often involves breaking up the issue or problem into its parts, pieces, reasons or steps and looking at how those pieces are related to each other. Analysis usually

goes hand in hand with “synthesis” which can be described as the combination of components or elements that form a collective whole. Key features of an analysis will include parts of a problem being examined, such as: reasons; causes; contributory factors; relationships; processes; and patterns. Synthesis is then applied to understanding the linkages between all of these separate parts and developing a “narrative” that provides a collective and comprehensive summary of the issue.<sup>3</sup>

Analysis should be reproducible, recordable and rigorous:<sup>4</sup>

- Reproducible because it should not be limited to fit a certain context so that it cannot be used across a wider range of similar contexts and issues. This would place limits on the analyst’s ability to generalise based on the application of the same analytical framework across a range of different contexts. This is particularly important in stabilisation environments where large numbers of bilateral and multilateral organisations come together with different experiences, approaches and processes;
- Recordable because the work supporting analysis should not only be used to support a certain identified problem or issue, but should also be preserved as a valuable reference document in order to inform, support and shape other related analysis, planning and decision-making. Analysis can be a resource-intensive exercise and can capitalise on valuable data gathering, assimilation and validation exercises, the benefit of which should be maximised as appropriate;
- Rigorous in terms of the evidence informing the analysis and the methodological framework applied. The use of a well-accepted methodological framework gives confidence to the user. Rigour also applies to the type of evidence used to support an analysis. Analysis which benefits from peer-reviewed secondary sources of information and knowledge will be better informed and more reliable in its findings than an analysis benefitting from “grey” literature such as newspaper articles and non-peer-reviewed policy papers. Analysis can also become more rigorous with the inclusion of both qualitative and quantitative data. For example, a political economy analysis of a particular region in a country would have most “rigour” if it covered: a broad, representative, cross-section of the population as opposed to a group of people from one urban location; input from different age segments of society; interviews with current political representatives alongside views from members of political opposition groups and civil society organisations.

It may often be the case that stabilisation planners will have limited in-country data due to the lack of a national census, or a lack of state presence in peripheral regions of

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<sup>3</sup> Bonn (2004).

<sup>4</sup> Macnamara (2010).

a country. For this reason, analysts will need to think of methodological approaches that will ensure that an analysis is as rigorous as it can be in a given set of circumstances. Even in the case of using a literature review to inform analysis, a sensible and balanced mix of peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, newspaper articles and policy literature would produce more rigorous and informed findings than an analysis supported solely by one, or even two, of these media. Adding primary data further strengthens the analysis. This can be generated through the use of interview, focus group, survey and questionnaire techniques.

## **Section One: The Importance of Analysis in Supporting Stabilisation Interventions**

### ***Why is analysis a requirement in a stabilisation environment?***

The UK Approach to Stabilisation and UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes, and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy, sit within a wider HMG strategic policy framework following the [National Security Strategy \(2010\)](#) and [Strategic Defence and Security Review \(2010\)](#). In this framework, comprehensive and multi-departmental (integrated)<sup>5</sup> approaches to supporting overseas interventions in predominantly fragile and conflict-affected states should be founded on effective analysis of the local, national and regional circumstances and contexts.

In a stabilisation context the aim is to enable a host government to progress towards providing security and development, governance and services through a political settlement that sufficiently reduces violent conflict. The mutually reinforcing core components of stabilisation are:

- Protect political actors, the political system and the population;
- Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes;
- Prepare for longer-term recovery.

Over the past ten years, close partners of the UK have taken similar approaches to addressing conflict and stability and have developed structures such as: Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (US); Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada); Stability Fund (Netherlands); and the Danish Stabilisation Fund. The United

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<sup>5</sup> Integrated approach (as promoted by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review) refers to people from different institutions (with particular reference to civilian and military institutions) working together at several levels to achieve common aims. An integrated approach recognises that no one Government Department has a monopoly over responses to the challenges of conflict and stabilisation contexts and that by making best use of the broad range of knowledge, skills and assets of Government Departments, integrated efforts should be mutually reinforcing. Other Governments and international organisations sometimes use “comprehensive” (e.g. NATO and EU) to describe similar collaboration. The intention behind HMG’s shift from “comprehensive” to “integrated” approach in 2010 was to establish greater cross-Government collective analysis and coherent strategy development.

Nations, World Bank, NATO, European Union, and other regional bodies, have also developed capacity to support multidimensional stability operations.

These comprehensive/integrated approaches to supporting overseas interventions in predominantly fragile and conflict-affected states require effective analysis of the local, national and regional circumstances. Based on the significant involvement of the UK and its partners in stabilisation environments, the need for effective analysis is seen as a pre-requisite for informing and shaping policy decisions concerning the use and deployment of national stabilisation capability.

### ***How analysis relates to the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes***

Of the nine UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes, five are dependent on effective analysis:

- *Work within the political context* – It is essential for stabilisation actors to be well-informed of the political dynamics at the local, national and regional levels. This wider political economy analysis must include the intentions and agenda of both internal and external actors;
- *Integrate and coordinate appropriately* – Interveners must be willing to analyse, plan, implement and review activities in an integrated manner. This underscores the importance of cross-Government structures and systems which underpin analysis;
- *Plan systematically* – Planning for stabilisation requires a joint analysis and an agreed set of goals and benchmarks. Effective analysis is a pre-requisite for the development of plans;
- *Analyse continually* – A joint analysis is not a one-off exercise and should be part of a stabilisation approach informing and shaping strategy, direction and activities on the ground. Conflict dynamics are fluid and ever-changing;
- *Engage broadly* – It is important for analysts to engage with as many stakeholders as possible, including marginalised groups.

## **Section Two: Approaches to Analysis**

### ***General Approaches to Analysis***

Analysis is normally undertaken in response to a stated need or requirement. This could be as general as the need to establish some broad programmatic priorities in a specific country or region, or as specific as the requirement to identify key threats and issues relating to border tensions in a specific geographical space. Once a general or specific objective is established, analytical methods can then be used to guide the search for credible and relevant information relating to the objective. In conflict and

stabilisation, analysis is required before activities start and during the lifetime of the activities as an on-going process.

Once data is gathered, understood and organised, “systems thinking” should then be applied to draw out the key issues and main “messages” which need to inform planning and decision-making. This step underscores the important linkage between analysis and leadership, as well as analysis and the roll-out of concrete plans. As a result of informing the development of specific objectives supporting planning, there is also an important link between analysis and monitoring and evaluation. Specifically, the potential objectives and tasks that are identified by the analysis should contribute to the benchmarks, milestones and outputs against which performance and execution of a plan will be both monitored and evaluated. Relevant and credible evidence underpinning an analysis may also become central to “Theory of Change” monitoring and evaluation methodologies which rely on evidence-based forecasts to inform the likelihood of anticipated change.

There are numerous analytical methodologies and tools to support analysis. There are no hard and fast rules about which, and how many, tools should be included to support an analysis. Generic qualitative analytical frameworks include:

- Instruments of Power (otherwise known as PEST: P-Political, E-Economic, S-Social, T-Technological, and its variations);
- SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) Analysis;
- CAGE (Cultural, Administrative, Geographic and Economic) Analysis;
- Delphi Technique;
- Stakeholder Analysis, or Mapping;
- Cultural Analysis;
- Scenario Planning;
- International Political Economy Analysis.

These are explained in more detail in Annex 1. Some (such as Instruments of Power) are more universally applicable and acceptable than others and can therefore provide a good basis for different organisations coming together to address a common issue.

Similarly, Stakeholder Analysis or Mapping can help understand the norms, traditions and practices of a society in which an analysis is being undertaken. This can be important for informing short-term objectives of a stabilisation team and the priority given to the building of certain relationships. Many Cultural Analysis models will also help stabilisation advisers understand the extent to which their own culture relates to the culture under study and, therefore, any adjustments that may be required to support both data gathering and the interpretation of data.

### ***The UK Approach to Analysis in Conflict and Stabilisation***

Consistent with the UK's integrated (cross-Government) approach to addressing conflict overseas, a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) framework was established in 2012. The purpose of JACS is to provide a basis to support integrated planning, policy and resource allocation, creating synergies between the UK's diplomatic, development and defence analytical processes.<sup>6</sup>

As with all analytical methodologies, the JACS is an approach but not a pre-defined product. It can be used to provide a generic understanding of conflict and stability in a given context, or to explore a specific aspect of that context (for example, cross-border issues, drivers of radicalisation, etc). It answers a clearly-defined question or set of questions, agreed cross-departmentally, that will inform future decision-making on resources and policy. The process can be a "light touch" or "in-depth", depending on available timescales and customer needs, and is focused at the strategic level.

The JACS framework promotes a generic understanding of conflict and stability based on the inclusion of different analytical capabilities which, over the years, have existed in separate UK Government Departments.

### ***Principles guiding JACS***

A JACS process must observe the following basic principles:

- Commissioned tri-departmentally at a senior level (three Heads of the country team, or London-based Directors);
- Commissioned with a clear policy or resource-related objective;
- Carried out and overseen cross-departmentally. A cross-departmental oversight team must be established to take the key decisions, including on ToRs and key conclusions. It must include members of FCO, DFID and MOD, plus ideally the Cabinet Office (and others, as appropriate);
- Meets minimum levels of quality control. A JACS must cover the core essentials of the analysis model: causes, actors, dynamics and triggers, opportunities for peace and institutional resilience. Consultants can play a valuable role, but leadership and majority analysis should be by HMG staff;
- Based on all available source material - both HMG and external. (aim should be to maintain the security classification as low as is practical);
- Receives sign-off by those who commissioned it;
- Alignment with wider UK policies and strategies must be considered;

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<sup>6</sup> A JACS Guidance Note and a recent Review of the JACS processes undertaken to date are available on the JACS community website hosted on the cross-Government platform, Collaborate at [www.collaborate.gsi.gov.uk](http://www.collaborate.gsi.gov.uk). (Login to Collaborate - on government internal networks only - and navigate to the JACS community).


- Conflict sensitivity ensured. Consider safety, security and well-being of stakeholders consulted. Ensure research and analysis approach does not exacerbate conflict (Do No Harm).<sup>7</sup>

Annex 2 provides a generic terms of reference that may be of use to stabilisation planners seeking to commission a JACS in the future.

### **JACS: A Three-Phase Process**

The JACS process unfolds in three different phases. These three phases are followed irrespective of whether or not a “light touch” or “in-depth” study has been commissioned. Figure 1 below outlines the processes and tasks involved in each of the three phases.

**Figure 1: The three phases of the JACS process**



Phase 1 of the JACS, or what is referred to as the “Initiation” phase of the process, involves reviewing what is already known, establishing objectives and agreeing the timing and the scope of the study. Focus is on drawing in all relevant parts of HMG to agree on key questions and map out existing UK interests and priorities. This is best done through a workshop linking all relevant stakeholders from both Whitehall and the theatre in question. In summary, Phase 1 includes the following steps:

1. Agreeing the team;
2. Agreeing why the analysis is needed;
3. Identifying the UK interest;
4. Establish the objectives and scope of the study.

<sup>7</sup> Conflict sensitivity (understanding that donors can do harm in almost as many ways as they can do good, and that interventions can have unintended consequences) is critical when implementing policies and programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states. The “Do No Harm” principle encourages organisations to strive to minimize the harm they may inadvertently be doing by being present and providing assistance.

Phase 2 of the JACS provides a “Detailed Analysis” and focuses on the overall analytical framework for the study. The framework is structured around the following themes and their interactions:

- Underlying structural factors;
- Actors;
- Conflict dynamics and triggers;
- Institutional and organisational resilience (opportunities for peace).

Phase 3 of the JACS process is concerned with consolidating a shared understanding of the analysis and ensuring that the findings inform coordinated and complementary actions across HMG and, where appropriate, in partnership with others. In summary, Phase 3 should aim to:

- Pull out and agree key findings from the JACS process to date that have most relevance for HMG action planning;
- Establish what the key findings imply for the immediate and future actions of HMG and partners;
- Where appropriate, provide HMG partners with an agreed set of findings and follow-on recommendations to guide individual departmental planning, and to feed into cross-HMG decision-making processes;
- Be finalised in a form that will be revisited and reviewed for monitoring purposes and contribute to understanding of changes to the context, institutions and actors.

Lastly, the JACS process also provides a framework for taking recommendations emerging from the key findings to the stage of implementing policies and programmes. These steps include:

1. Agreement on key findings;
2. Assess implications for action;
3. Assess implications for planning and broader HMG programming.

It is worth underlining that, due to differences in scope, objectives, timeframes, geographic area under study and the motivations of stakeholders commissioning the study, no two JACS processes are the same. However, what JACS does provide is a well-informed framework that employs rigorous and well-accepted analytical tools and techniques from both management and policy fields, and covers critical elements germane to conflict and stability. The impact of a JACS process will tend to be greater if a shared cross-Government understanding of the objectives of the JACS is secured at the outset. Individual departments currently use their own range of tools to design and develop their own programmes. The JACS approach does not seek to replace these. Rather, it provides a high level, strategic, multi-departmental conflict analysis that acts as an essential foundation for the subsequent more granular sector or area

specific analysis that is generally required to steer individual departmental programming, and inform military planning processes.<sup>8</sup>

## **Section Three: Other Analytical Frameworks For Conflict, Governance and Stability**

Because the JACS framework is a process geared towards cross-Government analysis, within which other analytical tools can be used, stabilisation planners should be familiar with a range of other conflict and stability-related analytical tools. It may be the case that HMG Departments commissioning analytical work are keen to explore specific governance, conflict or political economy dynamics of a certain country or region. A combined approach which draws on elements of both the JACS and other existing Departmental frameworks (and those of key partners) may support and strengthen the exercise.

### ***Conflict Analysis Frameworks***

With increased attention focused on conflict prevention, and the cross-Government efforts that this agenda has required, the importance of undertaking conflict analysis has developed across both multilateral and bilateral donors since the early 2000s. Whilst there are a number of different donor-branded conflict analysis methodologies, all follow similar logic. The central objective of the conflict analysis is to better understand historical and structural antecedents of violent conflict as well as issues which intensify existing conflicts. All of the available conflict analysis tools and frameworks look at the causes, structures, actors and dynamics of conflict, as well as the way in which these variables interlink and interplay with each other. Conflict analysis can focus on the local, national or regional levels and seeks to understand the linkages between these levels.<sup>9</sup>

Generally speaking, conflict analysis can be used to assess:

- Risks of negative effects of conflict on programmes and other interventions;
- Risks of policies, programmes or other interventions exacerbating conflict;
- Opportunities to improve the effectiveness of development interventions and/or other interventions in contributing to conflict prevention and reduction.

Most conflict analyses share the following 3 elements:

- Analysis of the conflict;
- Analysis of international responses to the conflict;

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<sup>8</sup> A JACS Guidance Note and a recent evaluation of the JACS processes undertaken to date are available on the cross-Government platform, Collaborate.

<sup>9</sup> Saferworld (2004).

- The development of strategies and options for engagement.

Existing conflict analysis frameworks include USAID's Conflict Assessment Framework, the Netherlands Stability Assessment Framework (SAF), the World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework, the EU's Conflict Analysis, and the Do Not Harm Program (Collaborative Learning Project - CDA) Relationship Framework.

USAID revised its Conflict Assessment Framework in 2012.<sup>10</sup> It recognised the need for less lengthy reports on conflict analysis and more tailored, evidence-based assessments supporting targeted interventions. The approach also tries to explore specific areas which may be most important for the purposes of catalysing change and impact within a twelve to eighteen month timeframe. This is currently under further revision (ICAF 2.0) and will be available to HMG staff and SU deployees, from the SU.

The Netherlands Government introduced a Stability Assessment Framework (SAF) in 2005. Like the UK and US approaches the SAF serves as a process management tool. It helps to incorporate information management and analysis, policy identification, and prioritisation into the development of an overall stabilisation promotion strategy for a particular country or region. The SAF consists of three major parts:

- Part I involves the preparation work of customizing the SAF to the user's needs;
- Part II involves mapping and analysis work that provides input for a draft reference document. This reference document includes a trend analysis, institutional analysis, and a political actor analysis – all of which help provide a sketch of the situation and identify priority concerns;
- Part III outlines activities to be discussed in a stakeholder workshop and helps the organization assess and translate the findings of Part II into the development of a strategy.

The World Bank's Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) is a tool to enhance conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention potential of World Bank assistance. The CAF analyses key factors influencing conflict, focusing on six areas:

- Social and ethnic relations;
- Governance and political institutions;
- Human rights and security;
- Economic structure and performance;
- Environment and natural resources;
- External factors.<sup>11</sup>

EU conflict analysis is still being developed but key elements include:

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<sup>10</sup> USAID (2012).

<sup>11</sup> For more see:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTCPR/0,,contentMDK:20486708~menuPK:1260893~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:407740,00.html>

- An analysis of the context – leading to a profile of contentious issues and conflict-prone areas;
- An analysis of the (possible) causes of conflict – distinguishing between structural (root) causes, proximate causes and the more immediate triggers of violent conflict;
- An analysis of the actors – exploring their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships;
- An analysis of the conflict dynamics – understanding the interactions between context, causes and actors, the distribution of violence, its nature and triggers;
- An outline of potential scenarios – possible future directions of conflict;
- The identification of existing and planned responses to the conflict, internal and external – taking into account all actors, including development, military and security, diplomatic, trade, migration;
- The identification of key gaps, options and realistic strategies to respond to the conflict, being mindful of the risk that any of these interventions might actually further increase the likelihood of violent conflict.<sup>12</sup>

The CDA’s Relationship Framework represents how an intervention (assistance) becomes a part of the context of the conflict, and demonstrates that interventions have an impact on both “dividers” and “connectors”.<sup>13</sup> It highlights six lessons learned:

- Any intervention that enters a context becomes a part of the context;
- Dividers and connectors characterize all contexts;
- An intervention will interact with both dividers and connectors, making them either worse or better;
- An intervention consists of both actions and behaviours. Actions reflect the resources being brought into a context (what are we doing?). Behaviours reflect the conduct of the people bringing the resources (how are we doing it?);
- The details of an intervention matter;
- There are always options.

The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) also strongly encourages the UN system on the ground and partner governments to undertake a joint conflict analysis as a foundational step for developing proposals for PBF funding. In this context, conflict

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<sup>12</sup> EU (2014).

<sup>13</sup> According to CDA, situations of conflict are characterized by two driving forces (sometimes referred to as “realities”): Dividers and Connectors. There are elements in societies which divide people from each other and serve as sources of tension. There are also always elements which connect people and can serve as local capacities for peace. Outside interventions will always interact with both Dividers and Connectors. Components of an intervention can have a negative impact, exacerbating and worsening dividers and undermining or delegitimizing connectors. An intervention can likewise have a positive impact, strengthening connectors and serving to lessen dividers. For more on this see: <http://www.cdacollaborative.org/programs/do-no-harm/-the-relationship-framework/>.

analyses are used to support proposals which draw from both the Peacebuilding Recovery Fund and the Immediate Recovery Fund.<sup>14</sup> The PBF's conflict analysis methodology prioritises the following areas:

- situation or context analysis (a snapshot of the conflict context, including historical, political, economic, social, security, cultural, demographic and environmental context);
- causal analysis (identification of the root/structural causes, intermediate/proximate causes, and triggers);
- stakeholder analysis or actor mapping (analysis of those engaged in or being affected by conflict, including their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships);
- conflict dynamics analysis (the resulting interaction between the conflict context, the causes and the actors, including potential scenarios, “connectors and dividers”, drivers of change and sources for peacebuilding and resilience).

### ***Governance Assessment Frameworks***

Governance analysis, or assessment, frameworks focus on measuring the performance, accountability, responsiveness and capacity of formal institutions.<sup>15</sup> This assessment approach is often used with an international political economy analysis, which investigates why deficits in formal institutions arise. The focus areas of general governance assessment methodologies tend to fall into the following four categories:

- Political system (elections, human rights, conflict, rule of law, decentralisation);
- Public administration (corruption, public administration, public financial management, public procurement);
- Social and cross-cutting governance issues (revenue mobilisation, service delivery, gender, environmental sustainability);
- Market governance (business/trade environment).<sup>16</sup>

Examples include DFID's Country Governance Analysis,<sup>17</sup> UNDP's Governance Assessment Framework,<sup>18</sup> and the World Bank's Institutional and Governance Reviews.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The PBF has two funding windows: the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) provides rapid funding for immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs; the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) is driven by national ownership and stakeholder engagement in the management of PBF resources at the country level. Application for both facilities should be based on a joint prioritization of critical peacebuilding needs identified by government and the UN system in-country.

<sup>15</sup> GSDRC (2014).

<sup>16</sup> OECD (2009).

<sup>17</sup> DFID (2008).

<sup>18</sup> UNDP (2009).

The 2008 publication of the World Governance Assessment (WGA) was a global (initially in 16 countries) collaborative effort to improve the assessment and analysis of governance, and to make governance assessments more relevant to local stakeholders.<sup>20</sup> The WGA builds capacity of local researchers, provides local context and allows for cross-country comparisons. The framework is a theoretically-based scale that employs the same governance indicators and approach in each country. In this context, indicators are representative of key issues in six separate, but linked, governance areas and include:

- Civil society;
- Political society;
- Government;
- Bureaucracy;
- Economic society;
- Judiciary.

The framework provides perceptions of governance amongst both state and non-state local stakeholders. It has proven to be a cost-effective approach to comparative data collection.

### ***Participatory Rural Appraisal Process***

Another analytical tool that targets local feedback and local participation is the Participatory Rural Appraisal Process (PRAP). It is designed to identify community problems and to plan solutions with the active participation of community members. PRAPs have proven to be useful for promoting inclusive approaches to stakeholder engagement. The core issues targeted by the framework are:

- A description and an analysis of the community and its context;
- The identification of problems and potential solutions;
- Project design, and programming of activities for project implementation.

The methodology facilitates the identification, preparation and design of community projects based on the reality and criteria of the inhabitants themselves. The approach ensures that there is a common understanding of terminology, that both primary and secondary data is used, and that visual tools are also used to maximise local participation and understanding. The data is then assessed, cross-checked and triangulated.

The UNDP PRAP Toolkit offers a selection of tools such as:

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<sup>19</sup> World Bank (2014).

<sup>20</sup> ODI (2009).

- Community mapping – through the use of a community sketch map. Such technique can illuminate a community's resources and facilities within their geographical area, map out conflict and insecurity areas at the country level and determine primary drivers of conflict;
- Venn diagrams – used for mapping institutional relationships and used to learn about the different institutions, organisations and groups within the community addressing issues of peace and security; the community's views on these institutions; and to identify areas of gaps/weaknesses with the various institutions and what might be done to address these areas;
- Conflict timeline – focuses on reflecting on the history of a particular conflict and analysing events that have escalated, broadened or reduced the conflict.

### ***Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic***

DFID's Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic (CPRD) is designed to help country offices determine how DFID resources can be best used to support countries in achieving a timely, self-financed and secure exit from poverty. The CPRD is based on the premise that the task of poverty-reducing aid is to support a country in establishing its own mechanisms for a timely, self-financed and secure (low risk) exit from poverty. The multi-disciplinary model, which has applicability to stabilisation contexts as well as to longer term development goals, proposes that establishing such mechanisms requires meeting the following seven conditions:

1. Political settlement and institutions: The political settlement supports poverty reduction and inclusive growth. Social and political institutions must be increasingly open and inclusive and citizens increasingly empowered to ensure that benefits are shared and sustained;
2. Conflict: The state is willing and able to establish sustainable peace across its national territory, and is free from, or can manage the impact of, regional and international drivers of instability;
3. State capability: The state is willing and able to deliver core functions, including providing security and justice, drawing adequate taxation and managing public finances in order to fund the social policy and growth environments, and is able to implement their on-going upgrading;
4. Growth: The growth environment is open and inclusive and facilitates private sector investment that results in robust, stable growth;
5. Growth transmission: The growth process creates jobs, raises incomes and has a multiplier effect which raises formal and informal economic activity across the whole population;
6. Social policy and service delivery: The social policy environment and service delivery is effective at reducing poverty, improving well-being and access to

opportunities and choice for all, and provides sufficient outcomes to support growth;

7. Resilience: The state and citizens have the will and capability to manage shocks and long term trends that have the potential to de-rail growth and poverty reduction, including climate change, natural disasters and global or local economic crises.

### ***The Military “Estimate” Process***

This section should be read alongside the What Works paper on [Planning](#).

The Estimate process is a decision-making tool which is used to deliver a course of action from a body of information. Based on the prominent role played by the military in stabilisation interventions, and the fact the Estimate process is used as the main problem-solving approach used by the military – it is an important analytical tool for other stabilisation partners to be aware of. The process is logical but also allows the use of intuition, which is also important in stabilisation theatres of operation where planners are often challenged by a scarcity of knowledge and information.

The stages of the Estimate process are as follows:

1. Mission Analysis – articulates the What and the Why of the task and purpose (both the Instruments of Power and the SWOT analysis frameworks can be used to support this stage);
2. Evaluation of factors – a list of tasks, constraints and points for clarification;
3. Courses of Action (COAs) – this is the intuitive part of the process where the Commander gives direction and guidance on the COAs that the planning team are to develop based upon what he/she thinks is within the art of the possible and what might prove to be crucial;
4. Development and validation of COAs – following the guidance given in the previous stage, the planning team develops a series of COAs for consideration and then validates each one;
5. Evaluation of COAs – a Cost/Benefit Analysis is completed for each COA that has been produced;
6. The Final Decision – the Commander decides which option, or combination of options, to choose based on logic and intuition and this forms a directive for the completion of all detailed planning and future action.

## **Section Four: Case Studies (Afghanistan and Sudan)**

This section provides examples of two different case studies and the approaches used by stabilisation planners to support analysis in each.

### ***Preparation for the UK Deployment to Helmand***

## **Background**

In 2005, the UK Government deployed a team from the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (the predecessor to the Stabilisation Unit) to Afghanistan to develop a preliminary plan in support of a UK deployment of troops into Helmand Province. Prior to the deployment, a desk-based literature review on Afghanistan was undertaken to provide some initial analysis and thoughts on key issues that should be further explored.

One week after the team had arrived in Helmand it linked up with a military planning team which had been deployed from the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to both Kabul and Kandahar (which also included a Political Adviser and a Development Adviser). Although relations with the military planning team were not smooth to begin with, the military background of the PCRU team leader helped to ease the relationship and encourage collaborative approaches to planning. As the PCRU Team had been asked to produce a “Civil Plan” – and the military asked to produce a “Military Plan” – the teams worked together to develop two inter-locking and inter-dependent plans which supported each other. Over the course of the four-week PCRU deployment, the military team demonstrated an increasing appreciation for the wider perspective that PCRU team members brought, particularly in terms of assessing wider governance, political, conflict and development-related issues.

## **Key constraints**

There were a number of constraints that the PCRU team faced both in-country and in London. As the PCRU was still a new cross-Government entity with a relatively unproven track record, Departments initially demonstrated some degree of suspicion towards the team. Other constraints were: a three-year time limit on the UK’s involvement in Helmand; and a limit of 3,000 troops for an area the size of England and Wales, with only a fraction of that troop number available for combat operations. Lastly, following agreement with G7 partners the UK Government wanted the intervention to support a counter-narcotics agenda. This was arguably difficult to achieve without changing the time factor or increasing troop numbers.

The team eventually made a number of recommendations which attempted to align as much of the analysis as possible to political decisions that had already been made.

## **Stakeholder engagement**

The core planning team was led by a former army officer who was employed as a consultant with the PCRU, and who had had extensive experience in post-conflict environments and stabilisation operations, including in Iraq. The other team members included experienced policy officers from DFID and the FCO, as well as a former member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, all of whom were, at the time, serving with the PCRU.

The team consulted with a wide and diverse group of people during the limited time it had on the ground. These groups included members of local and national government, other multilateral and bilateral donors, the UN, and UK, US and Canadian Government representatives in Kabul, Lashkah Gah and Kandahar.

### **Resources used to support the analysis**

No specific methodology was used to support the analysis which the team produced. This was primarily because no framework had been set out in the terms of reference and guidance given to the team, and because no cross-Government framework for stabilisation analysis had yet been developed.

Data was drawn from the secondary sources supporting the literature review, as well as policy-related material collected thereafter. Primary data was produced from approximately 250 interviews. In taking this approach to completing the analysis, the objectives that the team sought to achieve were twofold: 1) to obtain some “ground truth” in the absence of written material, particularly in terms of understanding the political environment; and 2) to engage with as many stakeholders as possible.

Logistical resources also restricted mobility. Although the team had vehicles, air transport was required to transport the team to Helmand and Kandahar. Some members of the team went wider afield for interview purposes and, in addition to requesting support from the UK military, the team also found itself having to request support from others such as the US and Canada.

### **Timeframes underpinning the analysis**

Not counting the pre-deployment literature review, the exercise was completed over a five-week period. The Head of the PJHQ Military Planning Team also produced a military campaign plan at the end of this five-week period.

Time constraints limited the team’s ability to generate a number of iterations of the plan and to validate the analytical findings. During the limited time the team did have, the main UK stakeholders were asked to comment on the plan and subsequently provided some constructive input.

### **Use of analytical output**

The output of the team’s work became the only collective plan and document that bound the intentions and aspirations of all HMG Departments. The PCRU staff continued working on aspects of the plan and setting out detail supporting some of the proposed activities.

In 2007, based on new realities on the ground and the need for further analysis - as well as the expansion of troop numbers from 3,000 to approximately 10,000 - work was commissioned to develop a Helmand Roadmap. This Roadmap essentially became a review of the plans produced by the PCRU and military teams. Other materials that

influenced the development of the Roadmap included a DFID conflict analysis and a governance analysis (both undertaken in 2007), and new open sources and material. The Roadmap was the first document that looked like a plan with military and civilian lines of activity although it still lacked a methodologically robust analysis. There was still no common and shared analytical framework between all the parties.

Following the development of the 2007 Helmand Roadmap, all subsequent plans appeared to be based on a “refresh” of the Roadmap and were commissioned as plans, and not as analyses.

### **Lessons identified**

A number of important lessons can be drawn from the Helmand experience:

- Analysis undertaken after decisions have already been taken on fundamental elements of a plan is counter-intuitive and unhelpful;
- Setting resources before an analysis is developed is poor planning.
- Constraints imposed on analysis, and pre-determining major aspects of planning, will only encourage those undertaking the analysis to explore what is possible in light of planning constraints. The PCRU focused on Lashkah Gar and not Helmand more widely;
- Faced with constraints placed on undertaking effective analysis, new challenges will emerge. In Helmand this included engaging with the military and bringing UK Government Departments together;
- A lack of analysis can cause major misunderstandings of the context. In Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007 these included the capacity of the Afghan Government to survive changes over time, remaining local perceptions of the British and Russians from earlier interventions, local administrative boundaries, and the way in which warlords acquired power;
- Without tailored and therefore, credible, analysis, it became easier for frequently turned-over staff to abandon previous plans and create something new;
- Tailored analysis must inform policy and plans. In Helmand there was little connection between analysis and actual activities and no triangulation or testing of assumptions. Other sectorial analysis supporting the police or the governance assessment was carried out, but without analysis. Until the later Joint Transition Review, there was no bespoke analysis of the strategic context in Helmand.

## ***HMG Programming for Conflict and Stability in Sudan***

### **Background**

The Sudan Country Governance and Conflict Analysis (CGCA) was initially conceptualised by the Khartoum-based (DFID) Conflict and Governance Advisers. It

was formally commissioned tri-departmentally (FCO, DFID and MOD) in November 2012. The analysis process was led and facilitated by a SU Stabilisation Adviser, drawing on cross-Government expertise from Whitehall, Sudan and the wider region, and working to an in-country tri-departmental Steering Committee. The overall objective was to produce a strategic-level analysis of governance and conflict in Sudan to help the UK Government and its partners develop well-informed policy, strategies, and programmes.

The process was conducted in two phases. The first phase sought to provide analysis that could be used to inform and steer strategic HMG political and development interventions in Sudan, focusing on such issues as:

- drivers of change in key sectors;
- analysis of drivers of conflict for Sudan's border areas and Darfur;
- gender and social exclusion analysis;
- analysis of the political settlement;
- analysis of political networks and institutional set-ups;
- analysis of key organisations, including the World Bank.

Phase two of the study would be used to support Sudan-based advisers in prioritising additional analyses on conflict and governance dynamics and to develop a framework for a "living" analytical process. The approach used to support the exercise was a methodological framework which combined the Country Governance Assessment and a Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (JACS). The study was completed in approximately four and half months with the final report submitted to the project Steering Committee in May 2013.

### **Key drivers**

UK officials in Sudan initially sought to carry out separate conflict and governance assessments but eventually agreed that, given the nature of conflict and governance in the region, a combined approach would be a sensible way forward. In addition, it was felt that the Sudan Country Governance Assessment undertaken in 2008 had become outdated. Although other analyses had been undertaken, it was also felt that gaps remained, including a good international political economy analysis. Following the 2012 uprising in Sudan, questions asked by both FCO and DFID Ministers concerning the UK's presence in Sudan was another factor that helped drive forward, and fully justify, the need for a CGCA.

### **Key constraints**

Key constraints which impacted on the study could be characterised as political, institutional, and logistical in nature. In terms of political constraints, it was felt that, whilst there was good cooperation and support for the study at the "working level", the same levels of support were absent at the strategic level. This impacted the extent

to which some Departments could be convinced of the utility of a CGCA/JACS study. Such strategic ownership of the process would have helped to expedite the turnaround time for feedback on documents and to promote regular cross-Government attendance at relevant meetings.

The final constraint to the study concerned in-country and London-based logistics. Coordinating meetings and accessing key stakeholders whose views are critical to a study of this nature is a challenging task. Good administrative support and an engaging approach that is able to convince people of the utility of such a study are required to overcome such challenges. The SU lead facilitator helped to overcome many of these challenges, and the hands-on process support provided by the Sudan-based Conflict and Governance Advisers was invaluable.

### **Stakeholder engagement**

Due to political sensitivities, the CGCA was undertaken as an internal process to HMG and not one which engaged the national Government.

The exercise was led by a member of the SU's Conflict and Stabilisation Team who had previously worked in the region, working directly to the in-country tri-departmental Steering Committee. This lead project officer engaged with a number of other regional offices including in Ethiopia, Eritrea, South Sudan, Libya and Egypt. In-country meetings and workshops were also held which were critical for capturing important nuances and subtleties.

The two Conflict and Governance Advisers in Khartoum assisted in setting up and attending meetings. The SU provided support (for the duration of the study) in coordinating cross-Whitehall meetings and in providing the lead project officer with access to Whitehall documents.

Inputs from national staff at the British Embassy in Khartoum were also valuable contributions to the study. In some cases, national staff members could provide a 40-year perspective on some of the trends and issues being investigated. In addition, they were able to debate these issues amongst themselves which exposed important nuances and insights. Most importantly, in some cases they were able to draw linkages between different trends and establish associations, patterns and causalities that those with only 2-3 year in-country perspectives would be unable to provide.

### **Resources supporting the analysis**

There was no shortage of literature on conflict and governance challenges in Sudan. The commissioning officials felt that the focus of the work should go beyond the literature and look at issues surrounding "everyday conversations". Despite the internal nature of the study, the lead project officer was still able to interview a wide range of relevant stakeholders and experts.

One other methodological approach used to support the study included the development of “trajectories”. Aligning the final recommendations of the analysis to the most likely “trajectory” (or future scenario) facilitated a logical connection between analysis and planning.

### **Timeframes underpinning analysis**

The exercise took approximately four and a half months. One critical lesson learned in the process was the time and effort involved in initiating and maintaining cross-Government relationships. Most stakeholders felt that the CGCA was a large exercise to undertake in the given timeframe, particularly in terms of arranging individual and group meetings in Khartoum and London. Difficulties in accessing some people in Khartoum underscored the need for sufficient time to be allotted to the in-country engagement and to exploring ways of mitigating the impact of lost contributions.

Towards the end of the study, and due to the size of the final paper and the busy schedules of those asked to review the document, the validation process focused mainly on the Executive Summary. This was not necessarily viewed as a sub-optimal outcome, as it still gave stakeholders an opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the analysis and recommendations reflected the collective thinking of both Whitehall and in Sudan.

### **Use of analytical output**

The output fulfilled the requirements of both the JACS and the CGA, thereby avoiding any duplication of analysis. The work helped shape and inform the new HMG strategy for Sudan. As a result of shaping and informing the DFID Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic (for which DFID-Khartoum ran a pilot in June 2013), the CGCA also had a positive and productive impact on DFID programming.

Despite the above successes, the format of the combined CGA/JACS study did not lend itself well to a template that could be updated regularly – something that had been mentioned in the original ToRs as a desirable output of the study which would support ongoing monitoring. Work is underway in-country to develop a more feasible template which includes key issues and trends emerging from the Sudan CGCA that the UK is keen to monitor, and indicators that can be updated regularly.

### **Lessons identified**

This case study has identified the following lessons for future JACS:

- Lead project officers supporting JACS studies should have strong inter-personal skills;
- Cross-governmental “buy-in” and support to the JACS process is required both at the working and strategic levels. If the working level does not have strategic

support and directives, then it is difficult to maintain cross-Government support in the face of competing priorities;

- It is important that a cross-Whitehall report like the CGCA or a JACS relies on in-country and Whitehall support from the outset;
- Logistical and institutional challenges can often be mitigated with the support of both in-country and London-based focal points who can provide the lead project officer with logistical, coordination and administrative support;
- In order to preserve the cross-Government nature of the JACS process, as well as the final output, both the dynamics and composition of the in-country office should be considered during the early stages of the design process;
- More discussion and understanding is required across Departments on JACS methodology and Department specific tools and processes.

## Conclusions

This paper underscores the role analysis plays in not only shaping plans and implementation frameworks but also in informing baselines and benchmarks used for the purposes of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). A more complete overview on planning and M&E approaches in support of stabilisation activities can be gained by reading the “What Works – Planning” and “What Works – Monitoring and Evaluation” papers in this series.

Both the UK Approach to Stabilisation and the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes prioritise the analytical process.

Based on its considerable experience in fragile and conflict-affected states, HMG has now developed its first truly cross-Government analytical tool – the JACS. While aimed primarily at the strategic level, the JACS analytical framework can provide a useful structure for conflict analysis at any level. It is important to remember that, due to differences in scope, objectives, timeframes, geographic area under study and the motivations of stakeholders commissioning the study, no two JACS processes are the same. JACS provides a well-informed framework that employs rigorous and well-accepted analytical tools and techniques from both management and policy fields, and covers critical elements germane to conflict and stability.

With the flexibility offered by the JACS process – and similar process-based approaches offered by HMG’s partners – it is important for stabilisation planners to be aware of other relevant analytical models. Such knowledge will provide a good foundation for working in multi-donor/multinational stabilisation environments. This understanding can also be enhanced with the knowledge of more generic analytical models, and the principles governing the analytical process more generally.

## Annex 1: Generic Analytical Tools<sup>21</sup>

This annex covers:

1. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
2. Instruments of Power
3. Stakeholder Analysis
4. CAGE (Cultural, Administrative, Geographical and Economic) Distance Framework
5. Cultural Analysis
6. Delphi Technique
7. Scenario Planning
8. Critical Path Analysis
9. International Political Economy Analysis

Key resources are included in Bibliography and Resources at the end of this paper.

### ***1. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)***

The SWOT Analysis is a well-known analytical tool that analyses the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, as well as the opportunities and threats it faces. The comparative value in using a SWOT analysis framework as one of a number of analytical tools is to identify the opportunities that a specific organisation may be in a position to exploit. The effective and efficient exploitation of opportunities is an important aspect of multi-donor coordination, value-for-money interventions, and meaningful impact on the ground. The diagram below presents a typical SWOT Analysis framework.

<b>STRENGTHS</b>	<b>WEAKNESSES</b>
<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>	<b>THREATS</b>

Strengths and Weaknesses should be focused on those issues which are “internal” to the organization and, therefore, issues over which the organisation can exercise an element of control. In contrast, Opportunities and Threats are dynamics that are external to the organisation and variables over which the organisation can exert very little – if no – control.

SWOT analysis will not provide a sufficient analysis of the environmental “context”. Planners are advised to use the SWOT analysis together with a number of effective

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<sup>21</sup> There are also a number of other frameworks that have been developed by scholars studying conflict theory and international political economy. See, for example, Montcrieffe and Lutterell (2005).

contextual analytical frameworks such as the Instruments of Power, Stakeholder Analysis and Cultural Analysis frameworks.

## ***2. Instruments of Power***

The original conception of the Instruments of Power model has evolved into many different forms and presentations. Generally speaking, the framework supports a “strategic country analysis” which is based on the assumption that nations are equipped with hard, soft and structural power capabilities. Readers may be more familiar with labels such as PEST, PESTLE, PEMSII, STEEPLE and other acronyms which group together a similar set of variables in a variety of orders. The following list represents the main themes that tend to characterise the Instruments of Power framework:

- Political
- Economic
- Military/Security
- Environmental
- Legal
- Technological

One of the key challenges of this model is for planners to take the data from the populated Instruments of Power framework and to examine interdependencies and inter-relationships between the thematic areas in order to draw out the “main messages” from the analysis. Whilst planners are usually effective at populating an Instruments of Power framework, it is the interdependency analysis which is often weak.

The Instruments of Power analysis often works when undertaken together with SWOT and Stakeholder Analysis frameworks.

## ***3. Stakeholder Analysis***

Stakeholder Analysis, also sometimes referred to as Stakeholder Mapping, is an important analytical tool. An analysis of stakeholders provides utility in informing and shaping strategic objectives with regards to relationship building. This is often important in stabilisation interventions when short-term objectives remain unclear and when the development and forging of relationships can inform some useful and practical short-term objectives. Stakeholder analysis is also central to the international political economy of a country and when election cycles and political timetables may result in regular changes to political personalities.

## ***4. CAGE (Cultural, Administrative, Geographical and Economic) Distance Framework***


The CAGE model was developed for business application but also has utility for stabilisation interventions. It is a useful way of understanding “distance” between the interventionist country and the host country.

Distance is defined broadly to include not only the physical geographic distance between countries but also the cultural, administrative and economic differences between them.

### **5. Cultural Analysis: The ‘Cultural Web’**

Cultural Analysis tools are of paramount importance for planners supporting stabilisation interventions. In all cases, it is critical that the implementation of plans is supported by culturally-sensitive approaches.

The diagram below outlines the key features of a Cultural Web framework. The schematic reinforces the importance of issues such as how employees are rewarded and recognized, how seniority is symbolised, what rituals and routines organisations must respect in the context of their day-to-day activities and what stories (e.g. relating to heroes, mavericks, and events) remain in the minds of individuals in the organisation and which therefore influence their thinking.



### **6. Delphi Technique**

The Delphi Technique was developed in the 1950s by the US-based RAND Corporation which, at the time, was searching for an analytical method of establishing consensus

on specific international issues. The process has also been used widely to predict future trends. The model recognises the high subjectivity and unreliability of personal opinion and the need for specific methodologies to mitigate against the potential impact of subjectivity and unreliability.

This process is useful to apply in countries/regions where data is lacking and where personal opinions and interview data carries considerable weight in the early analysis undertaken by stabilisation planners. This is particularly the case in fragile and conflict-affected states where civil society capacity is weak and/or where it is difficult to find national data and records as a result of weak institutions and even the absence of a national census.

The process below summarises the general application of the Delphi Technique:

1. The identification of a panel of experts in the area/subject matter;
2. A questionnaire directed toward identifying major issues or trends in the subject area;
3. The questionnaire is administered to the “experts”;
4. Answers are tabulated and then re-circulated with the collected answers to the panel of experts, requesting the questions be re-answered in the light of the “collected opinions”. A third round may be useful.

## ***7. Scenario Planning***

Scenario planning (sometimes called scenario and/or contingency planning) is a structured way for organisations to think about the future. It provides a framework for developing a shared vision for the future by analysing various forces that affect communities. The technique was originally used by private industry to anticipate future business conditions and to better manage risk.

The process of scenario planning usually begins with a long discussion by a group about how the participants think that big shifts in society, economics, politics and technology might affect a particular issue. From this the group aims to draw up a list of priorities, including things that will have the most impact on the issue under discussion and those whose outcome is the most uncertain. These priorities then form the basis for sketching out rough pictures of the future.

Whilst a wide range of scenario planning techniques exist, multiple scenario analysis has gained widespread popularity more recently. Support for multiple scenario planning is based on the recognition that evaluating the state of certain environmental variables in relation to changes experienced by other variables provides more accurate scenarios than those produced by single-trend analyses.

This methodology lends itself well to ongoing monitoring and review.

## ***8. Critical Path Analysis***

Critical Path Analysis (CPA) was developed in the United States in the 1950s to control large defence projects. With CPA, a project is broken down into sequential, interconnected activities. Each activity is assigned a completion time. The activities are linked, in graphical view, to show all possible paths to completing the project, and the shortest duration "critical path".

CPA is not suitable if projects cannot be broken down into discrete activities with known completion times. For example, on a new project or in complex stabilisation environments, activity durations may be difficult or impossible to estimate.

### ***9. International Political Economy Analysis***

Political Economy (PE) Analysis is a powerful tool for improving aid effectiveness. In addition to providing political, social and economic analyses, it seeks to go beyond the examination of formal structures and determine underlying interests, incentives and institutions that enable or frustrate change.

Based on the fluidity of the political space in which stabilisation and security reforms are supported - as well as the shifts and changes in relationships between different individuals, groups and governing elite, often as a result of post-conflict elections and referenda - PE analysis can be both informative and useful. It accommodates the activities and roles played by informal actors and systems of governance beyond the state. Lastly, it also takes into account regional dynamics and external international actors.

Generally speaking, the most useful forms of PE analysis tools focus on the following areas:

- 1) *Macro-level country analysis focused on structures, institutions and agents* – This enhances general sensitivity to country context and understanding of the broad political-economic environment. This can be useful in informing country planning processes and the overall strategic direction of country programmes;
- 2) *Sector-level analysis* – This involves sector-based stakeholder mapping and analysis to identify specific barriers and opportunities within particular sectors in which an organisation is working;
- 3) *Problem-driven analysis* – This is geared to understanding and resolving a particular problem at the project level, or in relation to a specific policy. It involves identifying the problem, mapping institutional and governance weaknesses which underpin the problem, and identifying political and economic drivers which constrain or support progressive change.

## **Annex 2: Generic Terms of Reference for a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS)**

While no two JACS exercises are the same, there are a number of basic issues that should be covered in a JACS Terms of Reference (ToR).

### ***Introduction***

The introductory section should include a brief overview of the context in which a JACS is to be undertaken, the key issues and the problem/challenge which HMG seeks to address. This could include: the need to “refocus” efforts to address root causes of the conflict; a newly stated HMG policy directive for a particular country/region which may require a more current/updated supporting analysis; or the need for a strategic-level analysis that could help HMG and its partners develop well-informed policies, strategies and programmes.

### ***Recipient***

The recipient – or the “customer” – commissioning the JACS should be clearly explained. For example, the commissioning authority may be: an in-country team which includes cross-Government representation; a single post-holder who is keen to inform further cross-cutting Departmental programmes; a Whitehall-based cross-Government team; or a combination of Whitehall and in-country stakeholders. It is also important to state whether or not the study is being commissioned by a higher authority such as the Building Stability Overseas Committee or the National Security Council, but perhaps with one Department or Unit (e.g. Stabilisation Unit) leading at the working level.

### ***Scope and detailed objectives***

The ToR should specify what the study will and will not cover. For example, the study might include a regional, as well as a national, analysis. If time does not permit, a study might only require a national focus. Significant time constraints may only allow for a desk-based, rather than an in-country field-based, analysis. It is important to overview the parameters and limitations which shape the study.

The study should have detailed objectives. While it is useful to provide one central goal of the study, specific objectives underpinning this central goal are necessary not only to guide the work, but also to inform benchmarks that can show the extent to which the work has been successful. These objectives should be SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Collectively, the objectives should lend well to the achievement of the overall goal.

## ***Methodology***

A methodology section should clarify the research methods and approaches to support data gathering. More broadly, the detail supporting this section should reflect a connection between the methodological techniques and approaches used in support of the analysis, and the detailed objectives that the study seeks to achieve. For example, requirements for initial literature reviews should elaborate on types of secondary, tertiary and “grey”<sup>22</sup> literature that may be required to inform the analysis. The study may also require a pre-fieldwork trip to the country or region to establish relationships, promote awareness of the work and arrange further formal meetings and discussions for a subsequent fieldwork trip.

Requirements supporting approaches to fieldwork such as focus group discussions, one-to-one interviews (structured or semi-structured), and/or the use of surveys or questionnaires for certain target respondents, should be outlined. The types of desired target respondents providing the data should also be outlined. This may include UK nationals working in-country, UK Embassy staff, international and national members of the business community, locally-employed Embassy staff, regional UK Embassy staff, etc. Lastly, the need for any data validation exercises – such as post-fieldwork telephonic communication or further in-country work to seek endorsement of the analysis – should be described.

It is important to consider the analytical techniques and methods employed against the resources that have been allocated for a JACS exercise. All data gathering techniques and approaches – and the logistics supporting these techniques and approaches – should be affordable and supported by the allocated budget supporting the work.

## ***Outputs and Reporting***

The ToR should clearly set out a list of deliverables and the dates when such deliverables should be submitted to the sponsoring authority. Some JACS ToRs have found it helpful to develop a ‘Table of Inputs’ such as that outlined below:

<b>What?</b>	<b>Resource</b>	<b>Input</b>
Literature Review	SU, FCO analysts, country specific knowledge and material, etc.	40 days
1-day UK-based Workshop	SU to lead and organise.	6 days

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<sup>22</sup> “Grey” literature is unpublished or un-indexed reports such as conference proceedings, unindexed journal articles, organisational reports, etc.

This exercise could be followed by a second table outlining the timelines and milestones supporting the work. An example of such a table is provided below:

<b>What</b>	<b>By When</b>	<b>Departmental Lead</b>
Draft literature review		
Workshop report		
Draft JACS Report		
A PowerPoint presentation with key findings		

### ***Management***

ToR should specify the lines of reporting as well as the management authority acting for this work. It should also be specific about which, if any, Whitehall or in-country desks will be used to facilitate the work for the JACS. This is particularly important for JACS leads who are external consultants rather than UK Government employees and who therefore require support for meeting facilitation, and access to written materials (particularly classified documents).

In keeping with good JACS practice thus far, the intended role of a cross-Government Steering Committee overseeing the JACS work should be outlined. In this context, the commissioning authority may find it useful to elaborate diagrammatically on management and reporting lines.

### ***Expertise required***

The skillset and knowledge required should include expertise for the core management team as well as the for JACS lead. Desirable skillsets and knowledge for the individual leading the JACS exercise may include:

- Knowledge of the country or region in question;
- Knowledge of the UK Government’s structure and policy framework relating to conflict and stability;
- Knowledge of, and experience working with, other international donor partners;
- Excellent research, writing and analytical skills;
- Experience in working in team-based environments, but also demonstrating experience in working on an unsupervised basis;
- Self-delegating;
- Excellent organisational skills;
- Excellent interpersonal skills and experience working with people from different cultural backgrounds;

- Strong security and justice background;
- Knowledge of different roles, mechanisms, approaches and policies of key multilateral organisations such as the UN and EU;
- Willingness to travel, possibly at short notice.

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