



## Political Economy Analysis Training Exercise: Dejuristan

### Introduction

This pack brings together all the material needed to run a one day training exercise on political economy analysis. The training exercise is designed to be run in conjunction with: **The Beginner's Guide to Political Economy Analysis** (2017), published by NSGI. However, it could be used alongside other guidance notes that adopt an 'everyday' or conversational approach to PEA. The exercise is designed to be fun and is meant as a light-touch introduction to the issues for those who are new to PEA ideas and practice.

The intention of both 'The Beginner's Guide,' and this exercise is to encourage development practitioners to have greater confidence in building PEA techniques into their daily work. As a result it is important to see the exercise as a form of encouragement – not a further step in mystifying an area of work that is often presented in overly complex ways.

This 'exercise pack' begins with the instruction sheet for the exercise organisers, and it is recommended that this is studied thoroughly prior to the event. The pack then contains all of the resources needed for the participants and also for the four role players, who become the heart and soul of the exercise (hopefully allowing long pent-up amateur dramatic leanings to emerge).

Each of the resources needed for the exercise should only be used with the intended users and the entire pack should ideally be read only by the Exercise Leader/s (i.e not by either the role-players or participants). To aid this process each resource is written as a stand-alone piece of work and once printed each can be handed individually to the intended users. It is recommended that all those involved receive the information relevant to them well ahead of the exercise.

And finally: An Explanation on Dejuristan.....

This exercise is organised around the fictional country of Dejuristan. Why this set of issues/problems? The system of government in Dejuristan should be relatively unfamiliar to almost everybody – the role of the Party and its factions and the main characters are intended to force the participants to try to create a new map of how a system might operate. Hopefully the outline also prompts participants to think through any stereotypical assumptions about how political systems work. The country is intentionally peaceful in order to put the focus on more subtle political problems. Ultimately Dejuristan is its own unique place with an odd and quirky system not like anywhere else.....which is also the case for all of the very real places where we might need to work.

Needless to say that Dejuristan and all of the related characters, companies, organisations etc mentioned in this pack are fictional, and any similarities to real people, organisations and countries are entirely coincidental.

Who receives what: Guide to the distribution of materials for the Exercise		
Sheet/document number	Recipient	Comments
<b>1</b>	<b>Exercise Leader/s</b>	The instruction sheet for leaders. Providing advice on how to run the exercise.
<b>2a</b>	<b>Participants</b>	The 2011 PEA report for Dejuristan. This now needs to be updated and should only be handed to those taking part in the PEA teams.
<b>2b</b>	<b>Participants</b>	The Terms of Reference that accompany the 2011 PEA and provide detailed instructions to participants on their work.
<b>3a</b>	<b>Role Players</b>	This is the context briefing for all role players. This paper contains new (post 2011) information and should not be shared directly with the members of the PEA teams (participants). Also included here is a check-list for role-players to guide their feedback notes on each of the teams.
<b>3b</b> <b>3c</b> <b>3d</b> <b>3e</b>	One <u>only</u> to be provided to each of the:  <b>Role players</b>	These are four role player character descriptions. Each should be provided to only one role-player who should not share their profile with others.

## Instructions for Exerciser Leader/s PEA Dejuristan Exercise

The Dejuristan exercise can be run with a variety of PEA tools and guidance, but has been designed for use in conjunction with **The Beginner's Guide to PEA** (NSGI, 2017).

The objective of the exercise is to allow participants to flex their 'mental muscles' for PEA by practising skills and developing their conversational inquiry techniques. This is therefore not an *output driven* exercise; in particular the end product is not the assessment produced by the various teams, but rather the constructive feedback that can help participants gain greater confidence in using everyday PEA.

This exercise requires at least 6 hours and should be divided by a coffee break. You will need 3-4 volunteer role players and at least one moderator/organiser.

These instructions outline:

- The briefing to be provided to participants;
- The structure for the final 'report-back' plenary;
- The briefing to role players;
- Annex A - Some key points that might be picked up by the teams.

The exercise leader/s should read **all** of the exercise material thoroughly in advance, including the PEA, the role player briefing and the role player guides. It is advisable for the exercise leader to meet with the role players both in advance and also prior to the final feedback session.

### Participants

This exercise can involve up to four teams of six participants. Participants should be provided with the 2011 PEA document in advance (preferably at least the previous day) and ideally should be aware of their team composition close to the start of the PEA workshop (to allow time for pre-exercise bonding) and can also be given the ToRs at this time (or at the formal start of the exercise).

At the start of the session the exercise leader offers the explanation below. The teams should then be given at least 40 minutes to read the materials together, talk through the exercise and plan their own approach. The explanation by the exercise leader may include introducing the role players, who should then depart to their 'offices' ready to meet the various teams. The suggested explanation can also be provided in writing to each team, and should include:

You have been given a Terms of Reference (**ToRs**).

The local Embassy has arranged for you to meet with three senior officials from three different Ministries. They are also trying to arrange for you to meet with a prominent Dejuristanian NGO activist. The counterparts have not been fully informed that you are here to do a Political Economy Analysis as your Embassy colleagues were unsure how to explain this work. The counterparts have simply been told that your mission is in Dejuristan as part of a 'scoping and stock-taking exercise.'

Please think about the advice from the 'The Beginner's Guide to PEA' particularly in relation to conversational PEA techniques. **If needed you can refer back to the**

**guide during your planning time.** The objective of your meetings is to better understand the context.

**During your planning meeting you may also want to refer back to key points from the 2011 PEA of Dejuristan and to complete the 2011 column of the 'Notepad' table in the ToRs.** This column is to allow you to summarise key points from the previous study so that you can better gauge changes when you then also complete the next column on the current situation – following your meetings. *[You may want to point to this part of the ToRs, highlighting the 2011 column for clarity – it is coloured light blue for ease of reference].*

During your planning discussions you must agree among yourselves how you will handle the various meetings so that you can secure the analysis needed to fulfil the ToRs. This means that you must agree how you want to introduce your work, what questions will be asked, questioners, note-takers, protocol etc. **We do ask that a different person from your group takes the lead in each of the meetings.**

Please also note that these meetings are only to gather insights to feed into your final report (**you are not expected to produce a full draft report**), and therefore the 'Notepad' table in the ToRs provides space for you to jot down insights. The ToRs then ask you to come up with quick bullet points in relation to the two big questions at the heart of the PEA task.

You will meet with the four counterparts in turn and after each meeting you will have at least 15-20 minutes to reflect and make notes, and at the end there will be a period to gather your overall thoughts. **Please remember that your counterparts are busy people and are senior counterparts from the Ministries/organisations involved.**

You need to be ready to report back for the final plenary 'feedback session.'

**Any questions?** I will also visit each of the groups during your planning discussions and so please do indicate if any questions as you discuss the PEA and the ToRs.

### **Instructions in relation to Role Players**

The role players do not receive the 2011 PEA (counterparts would not normally see this). Instead they have a 'briefing' which provides some guidance on the exercise and also outlines the politics of the context. The context briefing offered to role players is slightly updated from the information in the PEA to reflect the passage of time and contains important information that is either recent or represents the local view.

Each role player also receives their own individual **character briefing**.

Each character briefing provides important information on events, political dynamics and direction of travel. The role players should be encouraged to give 'full' answers to the team's questions, but these answers should be faithful to the concerns, interests and instructions of the organisations to which they belong.

The role players should not share their character descriptions with each other as these represent different viewpoints within Dejuristan. The role players should be reminded that relations with the international community are sensitive and in the past Officials have been embarrassed by accusations of being 'too friendly with the sanction-

mongers.’ The role player is not there to help the teams – but to help their own employers.

It is important that the answers given by the role-players are truthful, bearing in mind that counterparts might answer honestly, while moderating the degree/amount of backstory that they provide (being ‘economical’ with the truth). In addition role players should be aware that the exercise is intended to help participants develop their conversational inquiry skills (see ‘one hour PEA’ in the tools section of the NSGI Beginners Guide). It is therefore not helpful to the learning/skills-development of participants to have all the information offered to them as a single long answer to the very first question.

The role-players will have 15-20 minutes between the meetings and should **use this to make notes in the ‘check-list’ part of their briefing – ready for the feedback session.**

If only **three** teams are involved then the Government role players should be used, if four then the NGO role player should also be used.

### **Meetings and Report Back**

Each group should have at least 40 minutes with each role player and should be informed of the time period in advance. The teams should alternate between the officials and so no two teams will have the same order of meetings.

The teams should have **at least 15-20 minutes** to discuss their emerging conclusions between each meeting (space will need to be available for this). At the end of all their meetings the teams will gather their thoughts and prepare their key conclusions (they will need at least **20 minutes** for this final discussion). They should also be reminded that they need to discuss their conclusions in relation to the note-taking part of the ToRs (what has changed, who are key characters etc) as well as the questions.

### **Transitioning the exercise:**

The final plenary feedback session can be undertaken using either a role player-led, or a participant-led approach. **This reflects the need to transition the exercise from a focus on ‘ToRs and outputs,’ (the nominal tasks) to a focus on the skills and experienced involved during the conversations.** The final feedback session is therefore not centred on whether the teams succeeded in completing the task, but on how they performed in conversationally exploring the underlying political economy.

The feedback session should capture as much as possible on the lessons learned in undertaking the conversations and exploring the issues. This can be captured on flipcharts/whiteboards in order to produce an exercise ‘lessons learned’ list. Whichever approach is taken the issues listed in **Annex A** should be considered and can be raised as questions by the leader/s if they do not emerge from the groups.

### **The two different approaches to running the final plenary feedback session are:**

**1. Role Player-Led** – Having the role players begin the final session can help to underline the focus on ‘how’ PEA is done, rather than on the final analysis. The teams expect a traditional plenary in which they will present their findings; instead they are presented with the perspective of the role players, how they experienced the meetings,

with subsequent discussion centred on the style/approach of the teams during the conversations. You might start a role-player led feedback session by saying:

Thanks to all the teams – the good news is that you can relax a little as **we are not going to go around and ask for presentations** as advertised. The exercise that you have just done instead only uses a nominal set of output based tasks because that is how we work in real-world situations. **However the objectives and purpose are really all about developing our conversational PEA skills and so we are going to consider lessons learned on those first** – before we get to the conclusions of the PEA questions.

By honing in quickly on how the meetings ‘felt’ to the role players it is possible to challenge a ‘task focused’ approach to PEA which may not fit with conversational tools. **Role players can be asked to offer a ‘positive’ comment on how the teams approached the task, and a ‘tip for the future;’** it is important to use the time when the teams are ‘gathering their thoughts’ to co-ordinate this with the role players, who should draw on the notes from their check-lists. Some tips have included: *make time for pleasantries; don’t just run through a list of questions – actually have a conversation; don’t assume that people are only interested in their own areas of responsibility; and do triangulate information – if somebody tells you something then perhaps test it on the next person.* The check list provided to role-players helps them to prepare their feedback for the final session.

Following the initial role player comments, the teams are then asked by the exercise leader for their reflections on where they thought the various characters played by the role players were coming from, and what they thought the big changes had been since 2011. Finally the role players are asked to ‘fill in the blanks,’ on any gaps from the teams. This approach can help to highlight that the perception of people with whom we meet (in this case role player) is key to success and that they may have a very different view on the discussion to the teams.

The group should then discuss: *based on the feedback and the experience what are the key lessons that we take away with us on conversational PEA?* (Please make sure that the issues outlined in **Annex A** are reflected in the discussion – and if they do not emerge then do ask about these areas).

**2. Participant-Led** – Have the four teams present their findings, asking the wider audience after each whether they agree/disagree or want to make any comments.

The key findings, based on the ToRs, should focus on:

- What are the big changes that you have identified?
- What are the prospects for further progress towards the removal of sanctions?
- How can HMG support the reformers?

After each group presents ask them how they found the experience, what was particularly difficult, what worked well. At the end of the team reports ask the four role players to ‘fill in the blanks’ in terms of the nature of their characters, Ministries/NGO and also the major changes in the context

Then perhaps repeat back some of the comments from the teams in terms of what they found worked well and what was challenging. Then ask the role-players to a critique of how they experienced the meetings, what did they feel about the discussions and approach, using the notes from their check-lists.

The group should then discuss: based on the feedback and the experience what are the key lessons that we take away with us on conversational PEA? (Please make sure that the issues outlined in **Annex A** are reflected in the discussion – if they do not emerge ask about these areas).

**Annex A** summarises some important issues that should be aired during the discussion, and is relevant to either a role-player or a participant led feedback session.

**Annex B** includes possible TOR based answers on changes/developments, this will be useful during a participant led feedback session.

### **Exercise Leader’s Instructions:**

#### **Annex A - Issues that should emerge in the final session**

- Did teams **follow-up on points** made by counterparts by asking further questions, or did they stick to a script?
- Had teams **triangulated** information by checking opinion/facts with different counterparts?
- Did the teams buy-in to the **second-hand bias** of the original PEA writers, and their cut and dried view of some of the issues?
- Was there awareness that the **balance of power has shifted** since 2011? To what degree could they piece together the story of the political rapprochement?
- Do their findings cast any doubt on the UK approach? Were the teams **willing to reflect back on strategy/policy** based on local realities, or were they solely focused on the original ToR questions?
- Were the discussions **conversational** (friendly, with small talk etc.) or very task orientated? Were there long pauses when teams ran out of questions?

#### **Annex B – Possible TOR based answers**

The teams have been asked to provide analysis and information in two parts.

Part One – quick update of the key elements that underpinned the 2011 PEA:

	2011	2017
Stakeholders and Actors	<b>Foreign Min Joh</b> – conservative, <b>Fin Min Adef Huma</b> – Odu loyalist <b>Int Affs Salah Huma</b> – N/A <b>President Odu</b> – lame duck, conservative. Modernisation. <b>Oliver Kamu</b> – powerful, ideologically conservative <b>Planning Minister Sarai Kah</b> –	<b>Foreign Min Joh</b> – conservative, has become a key `mediator` broadly a Kamu loyalist, <b>Fin Min Adef Huma</b> – An enabler of reform who gives space to officials Saleh Human – N/A <b>President Odu</b> – has re-established control, appeals to moderates and conservatives (and some liberals).

	brilliant technocrat, pro-Kamu	<b>Oliver Kamu</b> – conservative but power has reduced. <b>Sarai Kah</b> – persuasive but possibly linked to the Oilgate scandal.
How do things get done?	Nepotism, patronage, Alliances across factions and regions  Family marriages/connections  The language of ideology	2011 largely holds true, but also Mediation/wise-heads defusing problems;  Populism and appeal to identity
What incentives influence government and stakeholders?	Ideology, Vision for development Clientelism	Ideology, Vision for development Clientelism Money/foreign resources The next election!

## Part Two:

1. What are the prospects within the regime for further progress towards the permanent removal of sanctions? Key themes to include in analysis:
  - Min of Planning could be brought onside as they want investment, but with sensitivities around international criteria (Oilgate);
  - President Odu – has reformed before (elections) and might do so again if he believes it will help his modernist vision;
  - Kamu is less of a force and his conservative faction less likely to block change;
  - The driver of economic growth is important; there is also a fear of populism and so improved delivery could be used as an incentive to make progress on the issues;
  - Hegasa may be less problematic as the flow of refugees has reduced; a deal may be possible;
  - Elections may be the toughest issue as their ‘hybrid system’ works (after a fashion) and moderates instability; disruption might worsen fragility.
2. How can HMG further support the reformers and help those seeking to fulfil the international criteria - what ‘pathways for reform’ and potential routes for engagement with government exist?
  - Min of Finance offers a route and working with that Ministry on IFMIS;
  - Min of Planning is westernised and educated but may be dishonest and is driven by self-interest;
  - Min of Foreign Affairs could be an ally if he thought engagement could help ‘keep the internal peace’ and if the international community took time to mend fences from previous experience of advocating engagement;
  - Odu wants to see modernisation, dialogue may persuade him, and he may want to secure a deal before handing power to others (insurance policy).
  - At a bigger picture level should we recalibrate any of our current approaches, either around reform or Hegasa?

## **Political Economic Analysis: People's Democratic Republic of Dejuristan 2011**

**Produced by Acme Development Consultants-4U (ADC-4U)<sup>1</sup>**

This PEA was commissioned by FCO/DFID Dejuristan as a contribution to the 2011-14 Country Planning Process. The Terms of Reference (ToRs) called for an overview of the current political situation and likely directions of travel in relation to:

- Democracy and human rights;
- Economic growth; and
- Stability.

The ToRs noted that HMG has reduced aid greatly, this was due to external sanctions, but there have been some internationally funded public sector reform initiatives, these have all underperformed (considered to be the result of a 'lack of political will').

### **General Context**

Dejuristan has substantial untapped reserves of oil and minerals, but has been beset by infrastructural and licensing issues that have resulted in only a small proportion of its potential wealth being tapped. This has left the majority of the population reliant on agriculture for their livelihoods and the state still receives over 60% of its revenue from customs duties, particularly across its busy Western border. At present taxes from oil production contribute a modest US\$5 billion per year to the national coffers, only \$80 per head of the population per year.

With aspirations to become a successful upper middle income country Dejuristan has found that its fiscal resources are pulled in too many directions: trying to improve education and health levels, pay for a large and restive military and improve infrastructure. In recent years Dejuristan has also been affected by international sanctions due to its support for the Kalora Liberation Front in neighbouring Hegasa, it is unable to receive loans from American or European commercial sources or the multi-lateral lending banks, and is barred from buying some imports.

Dejuristan has a ten year plan to raise per capita GDP to US\$15,000 from today's US\$2,500, at current rates of growth the target will be missed by some way. Parts of the private sector are booming but income inequality is a problem and unemployment remains high, particularly among the 55% of the population who are under 25 years of age and in the swollen low income areas that have sprung up around major cities. There have been concerns that unemployed youth will boost the ranks of ideologically conservative groups who hark back to the current regime's revolutionary Marxist origins.

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<sup>1</sup> This note is fictitious and intended for training purposes only, any places, people, companies or organisations mentioned are intended as entirely fictitious representations of generic issues/problems.

## **Institutional Environment**

Dejuristan's public service has prided itself on the relatively high education levels of its personnel, all professional staff must have completed secondary education and many have tertiary level qualifications, with a significant number studying abroad. Dejuristan has had a long-standing programme to improve the use of technology and has commissioned an outside consultancy company to help it with e-government: 20% of the population have wired internet access, but over 90% also have 3G or 4G mobile access. The e-governance programme is symptomatic of Dejuristan's willingness to fund flagship projects, although it is not always clear if these are the most useful priorities for tackling the range of institutional problems that exist.

Despite these flagship programmes the government has made slow progress in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the state itself. It has a reputation for changing institutional 'form' without addressing underlying 'functions'. As a result Ministries and Agencies are created, or abolished without any noticeable improvement in delivery of work in the areas involved. This is often ascribed to a failure to tackle problems of planning, prioritisation, budgeting, performance reporting and accountability. Government often seems reluctant to address long-standing challenges partly because vested interests are involved, including the ability of politicians to use the state as a source of patronage and control.

Political leaders all expect to see their own constituencies heavily represented in state employment. There has been a persistent problem of ghost workers, with senior managers either turning a blind eye to problems or actively profiting from them. Many official procurement programmes, whether equipment or buildings, are also beset by corruption resulting in poor quality delivery. This has been a source of frustration for foreign donors in the past, with Government agencies/departments often seeking procurement based forms of overseas support (such as provision of money for computers, vehicles or buildings) and these are frequently listed as the 'greatest need' to help government capacity.

The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have most dealings with the international community. The latter is deeply conservative and distrustful; Foreign Minister Joh believes that he had his 'fingers burnt' in the past in trying to promote dialogue, only to see sanctions tighten. Finance has kept an open door to the few donors working in the country, but the Ministry is controlled by Adef Huma, cousin of the President and one of his closest allies. While Huma is rumoured to be one of the few who can argue with the President and change his views he is not a technocrat (and is accused in the media of being a 'playboy politician'), he is committed to the survival of the regime, and in particular the survival of his cousin.

Another member of the Presidential family is Internal Affairs Minister Saleh Huma, a wily ex secret policeman who has control over both the Police and also the central co-ordinating body for local government. Finance, Foreign and Internal Affairs are seen as the three most effective Ministries with the best staff, and access to most resources. Despite their privileged positions all three complain that their Ministries are under-resourced and their officials seek a larger slice of the national budget.

Dejuristan has six provincial assemblies and a single-chamber National Parliament, however it is the **Revolutionary Council of the ruling Democratic Marxist-Leninist Party** that acts as the main accountability body. The Council must approve

all major legislation as being ideologically proper, and although elections are reasonably free there is an unwritten understanding that all candidates are drawn from the Marxist-Leninist party, including some small break away factions.

The politics of Dejuristan is often most noted for the fact that the rickety process of contestation through the party has so far allowed different ethnic, regional and religious groups to be accommodated. Although it is unstable the country has avoided outright conflict and political violence is rare, many of the actors are known to dislike each other intensely but are acutely aware of the devastating cost of conflicts in the region, and the risk that it would leave all factions as 'losers'.

### **Major Divisions in the regime – the main actors**

Over the last two year's Dejuristan's president, Samuel Odu, has suffered a series of setbacks in his power struggle with the leader of the revolutionary council (and de facto head of the army), Oliver Kamu. Odu came to power five years' ago in an election rated as reasonably fair by Dejuristan standards and is expected to squeak through the next vote early in 2012, but he has never fully brought the army and revolutionary council under his control. Odu still has some popular appeal and his support is strong in urban areas, his appeal lies however with those who see themselves as poor and disenfranchised, the growing middle class voted decisively for his opponent during the election. Odu continues to make populist speeches about more jobs and better housing, but without greater economic growth his ability to deliver is limited. He has talked about government becoming more efficient in delivering services and 'trimming the fat' but is not in a position to make savings when 70% of the budget goes on salaries and most state employees have protection from factions or powerful figures.

Odu, had originally secured the backing of Kamu during the contentious election campaign against a candidate from the more liberal wing of the Party, but was soon rebuffed by his erstwhile patron. The fissures in the regime have become increasingly apparent with the President and his closest Ministers coming under direct verbal attack from senior figures in the army and some of most important opinion formers in the regime. Dejuristan is not expected to descend into conflict or see a military coup, its tradition of civilian government is too strong, but the country is heading into uncharted waters.

Odu's many enemies across the political spectrum see him as potentially a long-term lame duck, with the army and revolutionary council allowing him to act as a figurehead while the real power in the state rests with them. Odu has been bitterly resentful of Kamu's growing distance, particularly after his son married Kamu's niece in a lavish ceremony last year. Figures in the revolutionary council have also spoken openly of ever growing problems of corruption, suggesting that Odu and his loyalists suffer from revolutionary "deviancy" and even espionage. One said that he believed "with more than 90% certainty" that Odu had been "corrupted by Western ideology". Kamu is also known to look at Odu's populist courting of the urban poor with disdain, warning in private that the President is 'rabble rousing'. A close ally of Kamu and head of a key provincial council, also attacked Odu directly. "We did not expect this kind of appeal to a cult of personality from him." He then said in reference to some of Odu's allies, that "some people seek to cause a deviation, and act against the country".

Odu has tried to weather the storm, carrying forward his own unpredictable brand of pragmatic-conservatism in interpreting the Party's agenda while also loosening the strings of departments controlled by other factions where his leverage has weakened. In particular he has continued his drive towards industrialisation and promoting science and technology as a way to create a modern 'socialist paradise' but has been frustrated by the fact that the main driver of technology continues to be the private sector and state industries continue to be associated with waste and inefficiency. President Odu has also made clumsy attempts to appeal to moderates, and even the liberal faction by talking-up the 'social market' model of increased foreign investment and allowing private schools and hospitals, albeit under 'socialist supervision.'

Unlike the President, his rival Kamu, Head of the Revolutionary Council, has a history firmly rooted in the Party and the army (his main powerbase and seen as more conservative than the rest of government). Both leaders use the rhetoric of 'modernisation' to gain support, stressing that a richer Dejuristan would be more secure and better able to withstand regional instability. Several Ministers seem to be edging towards Kamu's camp, perhaps gambling that power is shifting decisively in his favour. In particular the Minister for Planning and National Guidance, Sarai Kah has said that she has 'concerns' about current policy and direction, while the Minister of Infrastructure left a Presidential speech before Odu had finished, normally seen as a lack of respect. Kah is viewed as a brilliant technocrat and reformer, a Western educated economist who is comfortable talking about both long-term strategic priorities and also the immediate challenge of balancing the government's books.

Dejuristan's tradition of peacefully managing tribal, ethnic and religious differences has made the ruling elite seem relatively homogenous, yet in reality the various families that dominate politics often bear grudges that date from the time of their parents (or even playground spats at school). Anybody hoping to secure power must build a coalition of popular regional and Party figures, ensuring a foothold in the major cities and most populous provinces. This has become harder as politicians from the Western provinces have felt obliged to complain about the growing numbers of refugees in their region, there have also been grumblings from the south that more investment in infrastructure would help to secure the desperately needed investment in the oil sector – thereby creating more jobs. The provinces have tended to be dominated by politicians who can mobilise local passions, and this has included several who had previously become famous through Dejuristan's low budget but high output film industry. We assess that some of these may build their power base further by moving towards ever more populist rhetoric.

## **Conclusions**

Divisions within Dejuristan's political settlement create all the ingredients for the country to suffer a prolonged period of stagnation as the various factions cancel each other out. The institutions of state do have some capacity to deliver and in normal circumstances would be able to make progress towards the country's lofty goals, however at least two of the three best departments have become President Odu's last major power bases placing an emphasis on putting his most loyal followers in charge. The signs are that these Ministries are more concerned with accessing opportunities for procurement deals and funding than with pushing through major policy reforms.



Dejuristan PEA Exercise:

## Terms of Reference - PEA Dejuristan Refresh

### Background

The 2011 PEA document used by HMG in Dejuristan has been overtaken by events and is overdue for updating.

HMG’s objectives in Dejuristan are to **help the country meet the international criteria to allow the permanent removal of sanctions**. These were outlined in 2017 and are centred on:

- Ending interference in the affairs of other states in the region (Hegasa);
- Continuing the 2012 election reforms moving towards multi-party democracy;
- Investigating the 2015/16 ‘Oilgate’ scandal in which \$1billion of oil revenue ‘disappeared’ from government accounts and the Head of the National Oil Corporation was stopped at Istanbul airport with \$100,000 in his briefcase;

So far progress has been reported externally as ‘steady but not spectacular,’ however **FCO and DFID at post remain concerned that powerful forces within the regime are against any further rapprochement with the international community. They are also aware that many of the most important political figures are more concerned with the approaching 2018 election and the rumours that President Odu (who barely scraped home in 2012) may soon be forced to pass the baton to a successor.**

Please refer back to the 2011 paper for background, and also where needed the NSGI Beginner’s Guide to PEA.

### Part One – Updating the 2011 Paper

It is important to reflect on what we know from the existing PEA and what may have changed. The team will therefore consider key elements from the old PEA and make quick notes on how these will need to be corrected. The team will then prepare headline messages (section two below) to inform the final report/presentation.

Please jot down notes:

<b>Notepad:</b> brief bullet points only		
	<b>2011</b>	<b>Now</b> (do the meetings suggest anything has changed?)
Who are the most important actors – and what is the most important things that we need to		

know about them?		
How do things get done? What are the ways that influence works.		
What incentives influence stakeholders?		

**Part Two:** (please make notes to answer the following two questions in your report)

1. **What are the prospects within the regime for further progress towards the permanent removal of sanctions?**

What are the key themes/ideas you will include in your final report, what is your overall assessment of the where things stand on the sanctions issue?

2. **How can HMG support the reformers and help those seeking positive change (and who are they?) - what `pathways for reform' and potential routes for engagement with government exist?**



## Dejuristan – Briefing for Role Players<sup>2</sup>



### Introduction

For the exercise you will play the role of a local official in the fictitious country of Dejuristan. You are meeting with visiting groups at the request of the British Embassy and these groups will have prepared their questions based on a terms of reference. The purpose of the exercise is for the teams to 'flex their mental muscles' of conversational PEA (drawing on the advice in the NSGI Beginner's Guide to PEA). It is how they approach the task that is most important, not the end product that they produce. As a role-player **you should not** simply volunteer large amounts of information, but instead allow and encourage the team to develop their inquiry skills.

Below (section one) is a background note on the politics of Dejuristan. In addition you will receive a personal 'character description,' with details on your organisation and role. Your country briefing differs from the country briefing of those participating in the exercise in that it is more informed and reflects an updated local view.

Section two is a check-list for your notes on each meeting. **It is advisable to print one copy of the check-list for each meeting, and you should have at least 10 minutes between meetings in which to complete the check-list.** During the feedback session it will be important to reflect back to teams the things that they did well, and ways in which they might have gained more information. Also do offer feedback on any obvious problems in the basic 'style' of the meeting – for example did the group introduce themselves, did they chat for a few minutes to create a friendly atmosphere, were they 'conversational'?

Please do not share any of your documents with anybody who you think may be participating in the day. For the exercise we would ask you to meet with each group and **answer their questions fully** (not one word answers!) **and truthfully**. However you may of course choose to be diplomatically circumspect (but not obtuse) based on the exact nature of the questions and of your own role/briefing. **You should convey your own organisation's position in line with your role profile and of course you do want to steer the conclusions of the group. You may choose to volunteer pieces of information (e.g personal detail on some of the characters, or on organisation) as part of your effort to influence and shape their thinking in line with your organisation's objectives.**

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## **Role Player Briefing**

### **Section One: Country Context Overview for Role Players:**

#### **General Context**

Dejuristan has substantial untapped reserves of oil and minerals but has been beset by infrastructural and licensing issues that have resulted in only a small proportion of its potential wealth being tapped. This has left the majority of the population still reliant on agriculture for their livelihoods and the state receives over 60% of its revenue from customs duties, particularly across its busy Western border. At present, taxes from oil production contribute only US\$6 billion per year to the national coffers (a very modest amount given the estimated oil reserves).

Dejuristan has a ten year plan to raise GDP per head to US\$15,000 from the current level of US\$2,600, but at current rates of growth they will miss this target by some way. Parts of the private sector are booming but income inequality is a significant problem and unemployment remains high, particularly among the 60% of the population who are under 25 years of age, and in the swollen low income areas that have sprung up around the major cities. There have been concerns that unemployed youth will boost the ranks of ideologically conservative groups who hark back to the current regime's more revolutionary Marxist origins.

With aspirations to become a successful middle income country, Dejuristan's fiscal resources are pulled in too many directions: trying to improve education and health levels, pay for a large and restive military and also improve infrastructure. In recent years Dejuristan has also been affected by international sanctions due to its support for the Kalora Liberation Front in neighbouring Hegasa. It is unable to receive loans from American or European commercial sources, or the large multi-lateral lending banks, and is barred from buying many imports.

Sanctions are a constant frustration to the government and in 2016 the UN Security Council outlined a criteria for the permanent removal of sanctions. This criteria was based on:

- Ending interference in the affairs of other states (Hegasa);
- Continuing the 2012 election reforms moving towards multi-party democracy;
- Investigating the 2015/16 'Oilgate' scandal in which \$1billion of oil revenue allegedly disappeared from government accounts (the foreign media and civil society groups who 'broke' the story offered no evidence of this). Foreign newspapers also alleged that the Minister for Oil was stopped at Istanbul airport with \$100,000 in his briefcase.

#### **Institutional Environment**

Dejuristan's public service has prided itself on the relatively high education levels of its personnel; all professional staff have completed secondary education, many have tertiary level qualifications and high numbers have studied abroad. Dejuristan has had a long-standing programme to improve the use of technology and has commissioned an outside consultancy company to help it with e-government: 35% of the population have wired internet access, but over 99% of the adult population also

have 3G or 4G mobile access. The e-governance programme shows Dejuristan's willingness to fund flagship projects to demonstrate change and modernisation to the public.

Despite these programmes the government has made only slow progress in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the state itself. This slow progress is partly due to the need to safeguard stability and not overload the state with change. The political leadership is very conscious of the need to maintain equilibrium and to ensure that the state is at the local level reflects the main political constituencies.

Dejuristan has six provincial assemblies and a single-chamber National Parliament, however it is the **Revolutionary Council of the ruling Democratic Marxist-Leninist Party** that acts as the main accountability body. The Council must approve all major legislation as being ideologically acceptable. Elections have traditionally been reasonably free even though there was previously an understanding that all candidates should be from the Marxist-Leninist party. This 'understanding' changed in 2012 when several new parties also participated in the poll. The politics of Dejuristan is noted for allowing different ethnic, regional and religious groups to be accommodated, despite the rickety process of contestation through the party. While prone to instability the country has nevertheless avoided conflict and political violence is rare. Many of the actors are known to dislike each other intensely but are aware of the devastating cost of conflicts in the region and the risk that it would leave all factions as 'losers.'

#### **Past Divisions in the regime – the main actors**

Until their rapprochement, a feud between the country's two most powerful men threatened to break this peaceful tradition and tear Dejuristan apart. President Samuel Odu was in a feud with the Head of the Revolutionary Council (and de facto head of the army) Oliver Kamu. Odu only just won the 2012 election (at the height of the feud) largely because Kamu could not build bridges with the liberal faction or field a unifying candidate. Instead Kamu backed an ex-soldier who alienated even some of their own conservative grouping. The liberals fielded an articulate and dynamic candidate, and although she lost the vote she was subsequently appointed to the Cabinet, helping Odu to win over many in the liberal camp.

Odu still has popular appeal, most importantly in poor urban areas where party faction is less important than direct rapport with voters. Odu has an easy-going style that appeals to many disillusioned by the failure of past leaders. His appeal within the party is rooted both in those conservatives who held faith with him, and increasingly with moderates worried by Kamu's more explicitly conservative views. Odu's appeal remains weakest with the growing middle class who tend to support the liberal faction (and with it calls for an end to the dominance of the Party). In the increasingly critical media Odu has talked about government becoming more efficient and 'trimming the fat' but is constrained because 70% of the budget goes on salaries for the politically appointed civil service. President Odu also argues for industrialisation and technology as a way to create a modern 'socialist paradise'. However the main driver of technological progress is the private sector.

Odu's old adversary, Oliver Kamu, was originally a mentor to the President and Odu took it badly when their relationship broke down, particularly after his son married Kamu's niece in a lavish ceremony. Odu and Kamu came originally from the same

conservative faction and used to share ideas on how the country could combine successful economic development with a genuine socialist vision. Both feared the Party might become *'a catch all that means all things to all people without any integrity.'* The feud, however, forced each to compromise with other groups and now many liberals, and even rich business people sit on party committees. Both men were relieved when mediation by friends and allies ended the split and they make a point of meeting socially to reassure others that relations are good.

Dejuristan's tradition of peacefully managing tribal, ethnic and religious differences has made the ruling elite seem homogenous, yet in reality personal grudges are not unusual. Anybody hoping to secure power must build a coalition of regional and Party figures, ensuring a foothold in the most populous provinces. Each of the provinces have tended to be dominated by politicians who can mobilise local passions, including several who had previously become famous through Dejuristan's low budget but high output film industry. Some of these figures took advantage of pressure for 'democratisation' by foreign powers in the run-up to the 2012 election - they formed new parties that were well funded but won few votes. However following the election they have turned to increasingly populist rhetoric around religious and ethnic issues to try to win local votes, threatening the traditionally inclusive nature of the country's politics.

**Political Summary** - The system is dominated by one political party, but with a number of factions (some based around personalities) that are broadly characterised as Conservative, mainstream or liberal. The two most powerful political personalities both originate from among the conservatives, but have tried to build coalitions of smaller factions around themselves.

## Role Player Briefing

### Section Two: Check-List for feedback session:

**GROUP Number:** \_ \_ \_ \_ \_

During the feedback session you will be asked to explain how the meeting 'felt' from your side, and how your character might have found the experience. The feedback session should initially focus on the style/approach of the groups, not the accuracy of their view (this will be covered at the very end of the session).

You may be asked to comment on something that was good about the approach of each group, and to offer a 'tip for the future.'

At the end of the feedback session you will also be asked to briefly describe your character and their organisational view, this should focus on issues missed by the groups.

1. Were the group friendly, engaging and conversational? How did you feel during the discussion?

2. Did the approach and questions appear well planned? Did they seem to be trying to triangulate information (cross-check what they have been told)? Did they say anything that surprised you, or which seemed wrong/naïve?

3. Did the group follow-up your answers and dig into issues/information based on your responses?

4. What did they do well, what was the main strength of this group?

5. What is main improvement that this group would need to make to make best use of the meeting as an opportunity to learn about Dejuristan?



## Dejuristan PEA Exercise: Role Player Briefing<sup>3</sup>

### Director, Human Development Dejuristan International (HDMI),

#### **Background:**

You have been asked by the British Embassy to meet with a visiting mission, who are here for a 'scoping and stock-taking exercise,' presumably to identify new aid projects.

Your NGO (HDMI) is staffed entirely by nationals but receives funding from some international NGOs and foreign governments. HDMI works mainly in service delivery (health and education) and has micro-credit projects and an initiative to increase women's participation in politics. HDMI is well respected as an implementer and has benefited from the policy among donors of not funding government (due to sanctions). Your NGO is known to be 'non-political' but in reality it is difficult to operate if there are no links to the Party; in fact you went to school with several Ministers and studied in London with President Odu's son (who remains part of your social circle).

You don't really like politics, but most of the politicians that you know are no better or worse than anybody else. There is a lot of corruption in the administration, and government service delivery is very bad. However there is also corruption in the private sector, and in NGOs. And when you see politicians at dinner they frankly confide that although they want to make the civil service better, leaner and more efficient it is almost impossible due to the many interests involved, and in any case officials block reform. Personally you vote for the Democratic Marxist Leninist Party because the smaller and newer political organisations seem to be rabble rousing populists who want to cause friction between communities. You have previously voted both for the liberal faction and for Odu (who you consider a moderate and pragmatist).

The potential easing of sanctions could be good for the country and for the communities with whom HDMI works, and therefore you are in favour of ending sanctions (despite the fact that it may mean money flowing through the state and not NGOs). Like most Dejuristanians you also feel that the sanctions have been hypocritical given the actions of some other countries and wider global problems. You are also aware that the rich elite have not suffered, in fact most seem to be getting richer.

#### **HDMI Priorities and Messages:**

Please do make clear to the visitors that your NGO is local and that you are yourself Dejuristanian. The international community needs to understand that in Dejuristan everyone is corrupt and politics is thoroughly broken, and so they should stop trying to fix things they cannot fix and start helping ordinary communities who are suffering. NGOs like HDMI can do things efficiently and

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quickly and yet only have a fraction of the resources that are needed, **in particular local NGOs pay a heavy tax on vehicle imports and so you have far too few vehicles for initiatives like your immunisation programme. You also need hard currency just to keep the operation going.**

The international community should adopt a simple plan: **keep Dejuristan stable and peaceful, prevent populism and dissatisfaction from causing conflict, and at the same time fund education and health. The Party is also a de facto democracy and so stop being obsessed with politics, let the democracy in the Party takes its course and instead invest in local people.**

#### Other interlocutors

You have been told that the visitors are also meeting:

**Ministry of Planning** – Which is seen as a technocrat Ministry, the Minister is allied to Kamu, although rumours are that she would like to switch sides to President Odu. Planning is seen as very well run, although the Minister is viewed as ambitious and difficult to engage with, you have met her and found her well informed and dynamic, but not friendly. Planning is always focused on securing investment for Dejuristan and is known to be seeking support from any foreign country that will listen.

**Ministry of Finance** – Also a technocrat Ministry. The Minister is a relative of the President and an implacable Odu loyalist. The media occasionally make fun of him as a disinterested playboy, which you can understand as you have met him socially and he seems very easy-going and sociable, but not particularly interested in the details of government. However you suspect that he has some instincts for politics, and he is trusted by Odu who is not known for tolerating fools (even from his own family). The Ministry itself is viewed as competent.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs** – The Minister is a senior member of Kamu's circle and is also respected by Odu's people. It is always wise to avoid conflict with MOFA as they can determine which NGOs are allowed to receive foreign funds and MOFA is known to have 'no sense of humour.' You assume that MOFA will tell the foreign delegation that they must end sanctions quickly.



## Dejuristan PEA Exercise: Role Player Briefing<sup>4</sup>

### **Director, Strategic Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

#### **Background:**

You have been asked by the British Embassy to meet with a visiting mission, who are here for a 'scoping and stock-taking exercise,' presumably to identify new aid projects.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been trying to navigate the slow and laborious process of ending international sanctions against Dejuristan. It is now clear that this process has not been undertaken in good faith, with the goalposts continually changing; each time the Government has delivered on foreign requests further requests or new requirements have emerged. The Foreign Minister suspects that the Americans and British are stringing the country along to secure promises that their companies will get priority for oil exploration. In the past Foreign Minister Joh encouraged the government to meet the international community 'half way' persuading Odu to make conciliatory speeches and to offer to meet with foreign leaders – only for Odu to be rebuffed by those leaders. This hit Joh's prestige and he felt humiliated; privately he tells senior staff that he will do nothing to help engagement with the international community now. However the official position is that '**political will exists to build bridges and find compromise.**'

#### **MOFA Priorities**

Over time the main priority of the Ministry has switched away from building bridges with foreign powers, towards preventing foreign pressure from disturbing the hard won rapprochement between President Odu and the Head of the Revolutionary Council, Kamu. The feud between the two nearly tore the country apart and put all politicians in a difficult position, including Foreign Minister Joh who is part of Kamu's extended family and a member of the conservative faction from which Kamu originally gained influence. Joh used his good relationship with some of Odu's loyalists, such as the Finance and Internal Affairs Ministers to broker a compromise. Joh's peacemaking in the regime was greatly helped when President Odu's son and his wife (Kamu's niece) had their first child, and named the boy 'Oliver' in honour of his great-uncle.

The Foreign Minister now spends much of his time ensuring that no new divisions emerge. As Joh says in every internal meeting 'foreigners don't understand Dejuristan.' In particular the Democratic Marxist Leninist Party has become broad and so loose in its ideology that the Minister jokes '*both Trump and Obama could be members.*' This means that elections are fiercely contested, even with only one party on the ballot. International pressure did mean that, at the last election (2012), some new parties were allowed to register which tried to compete by appealing to populist feeling, including ethnic and religious

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identity. Odu was returned and now there is speculation about whether he will stand next year or position one of his relatives as a successor.

**Key Messages** – As a senior manager with MOFA you take your cue from Joh and his deep annoyance with the international community for ‘playing games on sanctions.’ Civility is important, but the international community needs to be clear that Dejuristan will not be bullied.

**If asked for an official response on sanctions it is important to stress that Dejuristan believes that the purported criteria for relaxation don’t hold water.** In particular: 1) Pressure to encourage new parties is misguided; it disrupts delicate traditions in a country that has political freedom, stability in Dejuristan is a precious commodity! 2) the pressure to end ‘interference’ in neighbouring Hegasa skates over the fact that backing an organised militia (The Kalora Liberation Front) stabilised the region and reduced the inflow of refugees. Joh bemoans the fact that he is told not to interfere when Dejuristan’s policy is working. 3) And Oilgate is an entirely domestic matter, not a legitimate area for outside interference. You are not willing to discuss a matter that is the subject of an ongoing inquiry by the People’s Revolutionary Anti-Corruption Department; perhaps the UK could return funds illegally transferred to London by wealthy Dejuristan business people, before asking about Oilgate!

#### Other interlocutors

You have been told that the visitors are also meeting:

**Ministry of Planning** – Which is seen as a technocrat Ministry. The Minister is allied to Kamu, although Foreign Minister Joh in private describes her as an opportunist who would change sides given half a chance. Planning is known to be reaching out to China seeking investment and that would greatly strengthen the country’s hand in dealing with other powers. Planning has also pushed countries such as the UK and US to end sanctions and to instead view Dejuristan as an emerging economic power. Joh also suspects that the Minister’s family was involved in Oilgate, and he personally views corruption with distaste.

**Ministry of Finance** – Also a technocrat Ministry and always keen on receiving external assistance, the Minister is a relative of the President and an implacable Odu loyalist. Although they have friendly relations Joh sees the Finance Minister as a playboy, whose staff are too keen to please foreign powers. He says that the Finance Minister is ‘not fully in control of his own ship.’

**Director, HDMI** – HDMI are a local NGO and their Director is well liked and respected in elite circles. He is seen as somebody who stays out of trouble and just gets on with the task of trying to do service delivery programmes. The government as a whole has a policy of making clear that foreign resources should flow through the state, to resource the ‘democratic choices of the people’ rather than through ‘unelected’ NGOs.



## Dejuristan PEA Exercise: Role Player Briefing<sup>5</sup>

### Director of Economic Engagement and Finance, Ministry of Finance

#### **Background:**

You have been asked by the British Embassy to meet with a visiting mission, who are here for a 'scoping and stock-taking exercise,' presumably to identify new aid projects.

The Ministry of Finance has been accused of being too friendly with foreign donors, largely due to World Bank help on Public Financial Management. The UK has not provided aid to the Ministry and has been one of the toughest advocates for implementing sanctions. Many believe that the UK turned its back on Dejuristan when the US proposed sanctions – despite strong historical ties. Caution is therefore needed, although Finance ultimately wants to see Dejuristan's international isolation eased.

#### **MOF Priorities**

Since the end of the feud between President Odu and the Head of the Revolutionary Council (Kamu) the ability of the Ministry of Finance to operate has improved greatly. The Finance Minister (your boss) Adef Huma is a close relative of the President and as a result during the feud had been shunned by those siding with Kamu. Now, however, the Ministry is able to push forward its agenda of reform. This window of opportunity may be brief and there is a fear that Minister Huma could be moved upwards in preparation for the election (2018). Losing Adef Huma would be a disaster as the Minister is respected internally for his deft political judgement, and he allows the technocrats to get on with their work. Importantly his presence reassures the President that the Ministry is 'safe' and therefore keeps the Presidential Palace at bay.

The media however like to make fun of Huma, calling him a 'lazy playboy,' and 'Odu's lapdog,' and you have heard foreign diplomats repeat some of these stories at receptions and conferences. Like most senior Managers you are acutely aware of the need to push forward reform while you can. But so far only the World Bank has been willing to help; all other donors waste time in long meetings about the economy and then never come through with support. In the past you have asked foreign counterparts whether you could gain exposure to how their countries run their budgeting systems, but the UK flatly told you no, **although you would like to try again.**

You expect that the foreign delegation will ask about Oilgate as the MOF technically has oversight of state owned companies. This is a sensitive issue as powerful figures were involved. You know that Huma is personally 'clean' but both Kamu and Odu loyalists did profit from the scandal. Your Ministry has moved, quietly, to plug the problems in the National Oil Corporation from where

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the money was stolen. However, political pragmatism means that those responsible will remain unpunished, indeed the case has been passed to the specialist anti-corruption police, who are the least well-resourced and least powerful part of the state security apparatus. The Finance Minister has refused to speak at length on Oilgate, saying only 'it will not happen again.'

**Your priority is the need for external help**, in particular with a Ministry programme to introduce an Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) which will allow all financial transfers and expenditures to be tracked across the whole country and all branches of government. This will greatly improve financial accountability. In addition the Ministry wants to introduce output based budgeting so that departments focus their financial thinking on what they are delivering to communities.

The problem, however, is the lack of Information Technology Equipment. The Finance Minister is reluctant to prioritise MOF spending over other Ministries for fear of accusations of bias. Some help with the programme to put in place fibre-optic cables and to buy computers is desperately needed. It is important to impress on potential donors that MOF needs equipment and infrastructure urgently if they want to see improvement across the government.

Other interlocutors - You have been told that the visitors are also meeting:

**Ministry of Planning** – Which is often seen as the other technocrat Ministry and who compete with Finance for external support, their Minister is allied to Kamu, although she has a history of changing sides depending on who is politically strongest. Many in Finance believe that she and/or her husband (Head of the National Bank) were heavily implicated in Oilgate, but given the sensitivity of the issue there is no desire to wash any dirty linen in public. However you believe that any foreign aid spent through Planning is unlikely to be used well.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs** – The Minister is a senior member of Kamu's circle and is also respected by Odu's people. It is wise to avoid conflict with MOFA as they stay above the political fray and wield real power. In theory they are leading the push to end sanctions but are known to be distracted by their Minister's role in keeping the domestic peace between Kamu and Odu.

**Director, HDMI** – HDMI are a local NGO and their Director is well liked and respected in elite circles. They are seen as somebody who stays out of trouble and just gets on with the task of trying to do service delivery programmes. The government as a whole has a policy of making clear that foreign resources should flow through the state, to resource the 'democratic choices of the people' rather than through 'unelected' NGOs.



## Dejuristan PEA Exercise: Role Player Briefing<sup>6</sup>

### Director of Economic Engagement, Ministry of Planning and Guidance

#### Background:

You have been asked by the British Embassy to meet with a visiting mission, who are here for a 'scoping and stock-taking exercise,' presumably to identify new aid projects.

The Ministry of Planning and National Guidance is responsible for developing the national plan (NP), setting goals for economic growth, social progress and human development. The NP is a consultative process, approved by Parliament for three years, and is part of the ten year vision (which remains: ***becoming a higher middle income country***). Since the end of the feud between President Odu and Oliver Kamu there has been a return to steady economic growth (including some investment in the oil sector).

The Planning Minister, Sarai Kah, is a technocrat and one of the most senior women in the Cabinet, she worked abroad for many years. The Minister is your boss and you have known her well since you both studied overseas (you in London). Kah is seen as a Kamu loyalist and her relations with the President are 'business-like' but not warm. The Minister is fond of the trappings of office and is known to appreciate 'tokens of friendship.' Her husband is the Head of the National Bank and is rumoured to have been involved in 'Oilgate.' The local media has downplayed the scandal, but CNN and BBC coverage ensures that it dominates gossip in the capital. The Minister is very sensitive to any mention of Oilgate and attempts by foreigners to 'blackmail' Dejuristan into holding 'show-trials based on lies and rumour.' So far, however, the international community seem to be enamoured with Kah as a forward looking technocrat, and she is keen to keep it that way. **The Minister is therefore keen that Planning is seen as friendly and professional in its dealings with the UK and US.**

#### MOPG Priorities and Messages

The Minister does, however, believe that foreigners should stop judging Dejuristan and recognise that the country is an emerging economic power (she says that when oil starts to flow they will change their tune). Also the Ministry has an 'ace up its sleeve' through your discussions with China, who may develop the oil region, including roads, pipelines, a new airport and coastal port. **The visiting team need to be aware that 'they are not the only game in town,' and that Dejuristan sees China as an important partner.**

Minister Kah has said privately that if Chinese investment is secured she could help Odu win the next election, mending their relationship (allowing her to switch sides again). It could position her to compete for the Presidency in 2024, and so she wants sanctions lifted on Dejuristan's terms, i.e:

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- Recognise that our role in Hegasa has been beneficial; the place is more stable now!
- The last elections already proved that the country is not a dictatorship;
- No foreign money was lost in 'Oilgate' and **the problem has been dealt with.**

The real story is economic progress and the international community would do better **through constructive engagement**. Also the only people who suffer from sanctions are the poor. **The Minister has also asked that you stress her need for Technical Assistance (advisers) to help her 'modernise thinking' in the Ministry.**

You know that she has several relatives in mind and an old college friend, and so **the Ministry would need to select the Advisers** (arguing that it must avoid looking as though it is 'full of foreign appointees').

If pressed on Oilgate Minister Kah has suggested, ***off the record but pointedly***, that questions should be asked to Ministry of Finance, responsible for regulating the National Oil Corporation (from where the money was stolen).

#### Other interlocutors

You have been told that the visitors are also meeting:

**Ministry of Finance** – Which is often seen as the *other* technocrat Ministry and who compete with Planning for external support, their Minister is also allied to the President and has therefore taken a dim view of Kah's links to Kamu. Many in Planning suspect that Finance has been 'smug' about the damage done to Kah's reputation by the Oilgate scandal.

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs** – The Minister is a senior member of Kamu's circle and is also respected by Odu's people. It is always wise to avoid conflict with MOFA as they stay above the political fray and wield real power. In theory they are leading the push to end sanctions but seem relatively disinterested in the issue. Their Minister focuses instead on domestic politics, nominally a politically ally of Kah he is rumoured to view all those linked to Oilgate with distaste.

**Director, HDMI** – HDMI are a local NGO and their Director is well liked and respected in elite circles. They are seen as somebody who stays out of trouble and just gets on with the task of trying to do service delivery programmes. The government as a whole has a policy of making clear that foreign resources should flow through the state, to resource the 'democratic choices of the people' rather than through 'unelected' NGOs.