

# Analysis, Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

*Issues Note*<sup>1</sup>

Stabilisation Unit

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been written by Marla Zapach on behalf of the Stabilisation Unit.

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## Acronyms

DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
IN	Issues Note
JACS	Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
SIN	Stabilisation Issues Note
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations

## Introduction

The Stabilisation Unit (SU) is an integrated civil-military operational unit which reports to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). It is designed to be agile, responsive and well-equipped to operate in high threat environments. It combines in-house staff expertise with the ability to draw on a larger pool of civilian expertise for specialised, longer term or larger scale taskings. It ensures lessons from practical experience are captured as best practice and used to improve future delivery by Her Majesty's Government (HMG).

Issues Notes (INs) and Stabilisation Issues Notes (SINs) summarise what the SU has learned to date. They are designed to inform strategic and operational choices made by HMG and its international partners with regard to activities in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS). They are to be read in the policy and resource context of HMG's: [Building Stability Overseas Strategy](#); Conflict Pool; Conflict, Stability and Security Fund;<sup>2</sup> UK Approach to Stabilisation, and UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes;<sup>3</sup> and other relevant guidance from HMG Departments.<sup>4</sup> They are aimed primarily at the SU's own practitioners and consultants, and those of other HMG Departments. They are not a formal statement of HMG policy.

This IN provides an introduction to Analysis, Planning, and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). It aims to: give policy officers and practitioners a basic understanding of what Analysis, Planning and M&E entail; explain key issues and challenges in implementation; and improve understanding of how effective integration of Analysis, Planning and M&E can support the delivery of cross-Government objectives in FCAS.

Analysis, Planning, and M&E are helpful tools not just for short-term stabilisation but for longer-term recovery. More detailed information on Analysis, Planning and M&E is provided in the **"What Works"** series papers published by the SU.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Announced in June 2013, for FY 2015-16, the £1 billion Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF, the successor to the Conflict Pool) pools new and existing resources across Government to prevent conflict and tackle threats to UK interests that arise from instability overseas. The National Security Council (NSC) will set priorities for the Fund, drawing on the most effective combination of defence, diplomacy, development assistance, security and intelligence.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Approach to Stabilisation and the UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes can be found on the Stabilisation and Conflict Lessons Resource (SCLR) publications page on the SU website at: [sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html](http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html)

<sup>4</sup> In addition to relevant guidance from the FCO, DFID and MOD see also CSSF Thematic Information Papers (TIPs) on Analysis and on Monitoring and Evaluation - forthcoming, to be available through the CSSF Joint Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.

<sup>5</sup> Also at [sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html](http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html)

There are two annexes to this paper: a short guide to the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS); and a table to help readers understand equivalent civilian and military terminology.

Feedback can be sent to the SU Lessons Team at: [SULessons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk](mailto:SULessons@stabilisationunit.gov.uk).

## **Stabilisation Unit Publications**

The Stabilisation Unit produces a number of publications in order to inform key stakeholders about a range of topics relating to conflict, stability, security and justice. The publications can be found at [sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html](http://sclr.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/su-publications.html)

A brief introduction to the different series and existing titles is below.

### **Stabilisation Series**

Core guidance on the UK perspective on stabilisation; how it should be delivered.

[The UK Approach to Stabilisation \(2014\)](#)

[The UK Principles for Stabilisation Operations and Programmes](#)

### **Issues Note Series**

Short papers aimed at policy makers, programme managers and deputy heads of mission to inform them about key issues in thematic areas.

[Analysis, Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation](#)

[Security Sector Stabilisation](#)

### **What Works Series**

These are long paper intended for programme managers, project officers and deployees. They include detailed tools and frameworks that can be applied to thematic or programmatic areas.

[Policing the Context](#)

[Analysis](#)

[Planning](#)

[M&E](#)

### **Deployee Guide Series**

Practical guidance intended for first time or seasoned deployees.

[United Nations Missions](#)

[EU CSDP](#)

[Military Headquarters](#)

## Summary

Once the National Security Council has determined that HMG will respond to a situation of violent conflict overseas, HMG Departments will begin formulating appropriate strategic, political and operational options for engagement. As described in the revised UK Approach to Stabilisation (2014), these options should ideally be: mutually reinforcing; developed through an integrated and civilian-led approach; and be flexible and targeted. Decision-making should be informed by a clear and regularly updated understanding of the context and drivers of the conflict.

In a stabilisation context, the aim in the short term is to enable a host government to progress towards providing security and development, governance and services through a political settlement that sufficiently reduces violent conflict.

Analysis, Planning and M&E (which are related and mutually reinforcing processes) can provide and promote the building blocks upon which transition to longer term recovery and structural stability can be built.

Strong Analysis, Planning and M&E will be based on the following best practice principles:

- Include a wide range of stakeholders in the analytical process to encourage buy-in from multiple stakeholders across relevant HMG Departments;
- Develop integrated planning practices to ensure a cohesive and collaborative civil-military effort with key stakeholders to improve mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities;
- Understand and agree from the outset, if appropriate, different departmental objectives, as well as indicators of success and periodic reviews of progress.

### Top tips for conducting Analysis, Planning and M&E

<b>Analysis</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Analysis should be undertaken before the agreement of strategic and programming priorities. Effective analysis should be based on a broad range of sources and resources beyond official reporting, including peer reviewed literature, informally published reports or material, interview data, and focus group data.</li><li>• Effective analysis should be conducted with clear scope and specific objectives in mind, to avoid overly broad and unfocused results.</li><li>• HMG Departments can take different approaches to analysis and planning, which can result in multiple, skewed or contradictory interpretations of the context. While analysis can be approached using a variety of tools and methods, the use of one analytical framework can yield effective results, and ensure that cross-Government discussion, decision-making and engagement evolves in a comprehensive and coherent way. The</li></ul>
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	<p>Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) is an example of an analytical tool designed to gather information, facilitate joint understanding of the drivers of instability and their impact on HMG’s objectives in a sub-region, country or region, and guide HMG planning and prioritisation through collaborative, cross-governmental ownership of the data and recommendations.</p>
<b>Planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular sharing of information between HMG Departments and between planners on the ground will encourage integrated planning approaches and achievement of multiple objectives.</li> <li>• Planners contributing to, or leading, a planning process should try to develop hands-on experience in different planning cultures, crossing barriers between civilian and military planning.</li> <li>• Planners need to be flexible and prepared to develop scenarios and options for engagement with incomplete information or at short notice. Planners should also recognise that stabilisation engagement will be planned and implemented to meet overtly political objectives, which may ultimately dictate how activities should be conducted.</li> <li>• Planning needs to be conducted by individuals with strong strategic thinking, communication, and inter-personal skills to manage systemic and political challenges, and maintain collaborative approaches to problem-solving.</li> <li>• Planning should include an exit strategy, which may require further scenario planning. These should be developed at an early stage of the planning process, and re-visited regularly to take into account evolutions in the local context, and UK priorities.</li> </ul>
<b>M&amp;E</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• M&amp;E is an important strategic management and delivery tool. It assesses efficiency, effectiveness, intended and unintended impact, and sustainability. It can also track changes in perception, attitudes and relationships.</li> <li>• M&amp;E can provide continuous real-time feedback, which helps policy makers judge whether UK engagement is achieving the effect intended, or whether policy and programme approaches should be adapted. Consequently, this can help reduce political and financial costs of potential failure.</li> <li>• In non-permissive operating environments, M&amp;E will sometimes be constrained by lack of access to complete data. In these circumstances, a pragmatic approach should be adopted, and assessments based on data deemed “good enough” if taken from consistently accessible primary and secondary sources. But equally, advance investment in comprehensive monitoring capabilities has been shown to deliver significant benefits, even in insecure environments.</li> <li>• In addition to the live reporting available through an M&amp;E framework, periodic formal evaluations are essential for accountability purposes, and to inform future UK engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states.</li> </ul>

## Section One: The Importance of Analysis, Planning, and Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)

In the revised UK Approach to Stabilisation (2014), stabilisation is defined as:

*“...one of the approaches used in situations of violent conflict which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building an enabling environment for structural stability.”*

This approach sits within a wider HMG strategic, policy and resource framework: the National Security Strategy (2010); the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010); the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011); and the new Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.<sup>6</sup> In this framework, comprehensive and multi-departmental (integrated) approaches to supporting overseas interventions in predominantly fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) should be founded on effective analysis of the local, national and regional circumstances and contexts, and appropriate planning and M&E.

In a stabilisation context the aim is to enable a host government to progress towards providing security and development, governance and services through a political settlement that sufficiently reduces violent conflict. The mutually reinforcing core components of stabilisation are:

- Protect political actors, the political system and the population;
- Promote, consolidate and strengthen political processes;
- Prepare for longer-term recovery.

Failure to conduct effective Analysis, Planning and M&E can have the following negative consequences:

- If the context<sup>7</sup> is not understood through a proper analysis, there is a strong risk that engagement planning may only reflect the subjective and incomplete understanding of those most recently involved. UK engagement might be misdirected, and have the opposite effect intended, inadvertently breaking the “Do No Harm” principle;<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Over the past ten years, close partners of the UK have taken similar approaches to addressing conflict and stability and have developed structures such as: Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (US); Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (Canada); Stability Fund (Netherlands); and the Danish Stabilisation Fund. The United Nations, World Bank, NATO, European Union, and other regional bodies, have also developed capacity to support multidimensional stability operations.


<sup>7</sup> Here context could include a strategic analysis of historic, economic, regional, political, security, environmental and social factors at play.

<sup>8</sup> The “Do No Harm” principle encourages organisations to strive to minimize the harm they may inadvertently be doing by being present and providing assistance.

- Human and financial resources could be wasted on policies, programmes, and projects which neither target nor influence the changes in attitude, behaviour and perception necessary to ensure stability for further development and governance support;
- Stabilisation efforts based on poor or non-existent Analysis, Planning and M&E systems often have to be re-started, because of limited positive or measurable impact from policy or programming engagement;
- Positive/negative lessons from UK engagement cannot be captured, or applied to other stabilisation interventions, which are then at risk of committing the same mistakes.

## Section Two: Understanding the Analysis, Planning and M&E Cycle

Analysis, Planning and M&E are often considered in a programme or project cycle context, as depicted in this diagram:



**Figure 1 Programme or Project Cycle**

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See [http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world\\_development\\_report\\_2011/abstract/WB.978-0-8213-8439-8.abstract](http://wdronline.worldbank.org/worldbank/a/c.html/world_development_report_2011/abstract/WB.978-0-8213-8439-8.abstract)

Civilian and military programme management cycles relevant to activities in FCAS can be depicted in the following diagrams.



Figure 2 Military aspects of Analysis, Planning and M&E




Figure 3 Civilian components of Analysis, Planning and M&E

These cycles should not be seen as mutually exclusive. The key concepts are described below.

**Analysis** is a detailed and structured examination of the elements of a problem, which forms the basis for subsequent discussion, interpretation and action. Analysis of present, future and emerging issues of a conflict is an essential element of UK strategic planning.

Effective and comprehensive analysis involves addressing issues such as root causes, contributory factors, relationships, processes and patterns. HMG Departments should collaborate to arrive at a common basis of understanding of context, problem, and recommended courses of action. One important tool available is the Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS). Annex 1 provides a short guide to JACS and more can be found in the [What Works paper on Planning](#).

**Planning** is a process that overlaps with, and follows on from, analysis and contributes to the development of a clearly defined M&E framework.

Generally, a proposed plan or set of activities is discussed with cross-Government stakeholders, identified during the analysis process, in order to agree on key objectives. In many cases, these plans are not standalone exercises, but sit under a wider departmental, country or regional strategy. Plans should be reviewed, and potentially revised, based on updated information about the political or operational context, or changing UK priorities. Consequently, the process of developing or updating a plan plays an additional role in promoting internal departmental

and external cross-Government coordination, and de-confliction of efforts. Useful additional detail might include clarification of both working level and senior governance structures, for example a cross-Government steering group.

Planning requires regular assessment, building in flexibility for changing or unforeseen conditions. M&E should be built into the plan to ensure consistent assessment of the achievement of intended outcomes. Findings extracted from this process will then provide valuable lessons as well as help determine a practical exit strategy.

***Example: Somalia (2012)***

**Challenge:** The need for an inclusive, representative and legitimate national political process and more accountable national government; essential for lasting peace in Somalia. Donors, including the UK, were unable to directly monitor the implementation of activities they were funding, due to insecurity and a lack of field presence. Donors lacked understanding of the Somali cultural/clan/political context. Donors found it difficult to triangulate data coming from implementing partners. Donors were under political pressure to deliver urgent support resulting in an absence of M&E systems based on common baselines and metrics, or other joint donor governance systems for accounting, reporting, fund management, as well as results tracking.

**Action:** The UK Stabilisation Team began working with implementing local partners that had an active field presence. They also invested in third party monitoring mechanisms. This included the establishment of an internal audit function through the Counter Fraud Unit, which monitored the implementation of programmes and reported internally, as well as an array of verification sources. A Programme Advisory Team (PAT) was also established to verify implementing partners' due diligence and project delivery. The PAT mechanism also helped HMG analyse potential partners and collect critical intelligence to increase contextual understanding.

**Result:** Frameworks balanced flexibility with rigour and constructed a picture of what success in the Somali context would look like. This provided information on the wider political-security-economic dynamic and informed understanding of the issues, their effect and impact.

**Monitoring** is a systematic collection of data and information to enable an assessment of progress against objectives and outcomes, measured by targets and milestones developed in the analysis and planning stages of the stabilisation activity.<sup>9</sup> Monitoring detects when activities may not be progressing as expected, and where corrective action may be needed to meet the original objectives, or address new information from updated analyses.

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<sup>9</sup> See OECD-DAC Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (2008).

**Evaluation** is a systematic and objective assessment of a completed activity or intervention. It determines the efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of actions, and enables decision makers to draw lessons for other concurrent and future programmes. The process of setting up M&E systems to measure progress should begin during the initial analysis and planning phases of UK engagement. Measuring progress requires clear and well-integrated and realistic goals, based on an accurate baseline assessment and conflict analysis that directly feeds into the strategic planning process.

In all of the above, conflict sensitivity (understanding that donors can do harm in almost as many ways as they can do good, and that interventions can have unintended consequences) is critical when implementing policies and programmes in FCAS.<sup>10</sup>

## **Section Three: Key Challenges of Analysis, Planning and M&E in FCAS Contexts**

FCAS contexts present specific challenges for Analytical, Planning and M&E frameworks. This is due to the complexity and volatility of the environment, as well as often restricted access to stakeholders and beneficiaries. These logistical challenges are often compounded by: time pressure associated with a rapidly evolving situation; high demand for quick response/support; as well as a multitude of actors, each with a different understanding of the problems and how they should be solved, and answering to different mandates and timescales.

### ***i. Scarce data and limited information***

At the start of a conflict, there may be little or no useful current data or literature about the country or region in question. Existing strategic analyses may be outdated, or based on non-comprehensive data. Interventions could suffer from a faulty or hastily undertaken initial analysis, overlooking or underestimating the real drivers of instability, and presenting a false understanding of the context, undermining all subsequent planned activity. In addition, practitioners often neglect to include a gender-specific methodology for collecting data in conflict situations.

### ***ii. Lack of resources —human and financial***

Comprehensive Analysis, Planning and M&E is resource-intensive and may require dedicated logistical support that is not included in budgetary planning,<sup>11</sup> or is not feasible due to conflict-related activity in certain areas or regions.

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<sup>10</sup> DFID guidance: <http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/publications/conducting-conflict-assessments-guidance-notes>.

<sup>11</sup> OECD-DAC guidelines recommend at least 10% of a programme budget in fragile and conflict-affected states should be allocated for M&E.

**iii. *Lack of flexibility and adaptability to evolving conditions***

Conflict environments are complex and turbulent. Progress is generally non-linear, and the impact of activities can be difficult to predict. Sometimes there is little time or political will to revisit initial assumptions and adapt existing plans. New information and analysis resulting from significant changes in the conflict dynamics should trigger a stock take and re-shaping of stabilisation activities. Key stakeholders and partners should be consulted to maintain continued buy-in and shared understanding of objectives.

**iv. *Short implementation timeframes and pressure to show results***

The management culture of most external agencies and departments in conflict environments encourages reporting on quick success in delivering programmes in order to meet domestic political and media interest. Faced with such pressure and the need to show quick results, staff can be compelled to demonstrate the success of an activity or output without recourse to robust M&E.

**v. *Political dynamics***

Analysis, Planning and M&E is a dynamic process, which requires continual monitoring and updating of assumptions. There is always an element of risk when policy and programmatic priorities are based on a “snapshot in time” and remain unchallenged even as understanding of the context, environment and stakeholders evolves.

**vi. *Institutional differences of approach and competition between agencies and departments***

Despite increasing collaboration at the analysis stage of an intervention, integrated approaches to planning and M&E by HMG departments are not consistently demonstrated. This can create duplication and overlap of efforts.

Competing interests and a lack of coordination between governments and multilateral organisations also prevent sharing of information, and encourages planning and programming in siloes. This can have detrimental effects. Strong partnerships are necessary to bring about changes in behaviour and increase stability in a complex, turbulent and rapidly evolving conflict. There may be multiple actors (local, national and international) on the ground, undertaking a range of concurrent activities, working to different mandates and timescales. Unless analysts and planners understand diverse approaches to UK civilian, military, and international conflict-sensitive planning approaches it can be difficult to work effectively and flexibly with partners, and achieve the exit strategy which should be built in to the design of an activity and developed as the context changes.

### ***vii. Instability and insecurity***

Insecure operating environments can impede data collection and inhibit the effective reformulation or adaptation of plans and strategies should the interventions not be yielding results. Insecurity, most acutely felt by those working at the local level, can make it difficult to find the right people and ask the right questions as well as interpret the answers correctly in order for data collection and resulting planning and M&E to be useful. In insecure areas, monitoring may not be possible and measuring progress against planned objectives can be compromised or diluted by limited and unreliable information, corruption or social bias. Even where monitoring can be undertaken, sophisticated measures for detecting fraud in the collection process are needed - eg where those involved in the fieldwork are reluctant to place themselves at risk and submit falsified information.

### ***viii. Measuring effectiveness of activities***

Activities (especially stabilisation) in FCAS do not lend themselves to linear planning. This can make it difficult to establish reliable baselines and to distinguish between strategic shifts and shorter-term fluctuations as well as to attribute cause and effect of an intervention. Metrics that can measure a change in the perceptions of people and behaviours are difficult to develop at the best of times. Change can take place over long periods in complex and dynamic environments where it is difficult to make causal links between inputs and outputs, outcomes and impact and to isolate the effect of any one intervention. The most relevant information to measure progress - for example perceptions, relationships and behaviours - is qualitative in nature, can be challenging to gauge, and requires a comprehensive social/political/contextual analysis. In complex contexts, interventions do not always produce the intended results or anticipated impacts. Equally, the temptation to distort M&E systems because of pressure to generate “good news” stories and communications negatively influences how M&E could be used constructively to reinforce programming.

## **Conclusions**

Analysis, Planning and M&E are important in fragile and conflict-affected states, and especially in stabilisation contexts, as they are the first steps in providing or promoting the building blocks upon which transition to longer term structural stability can be built. It is important to understand Analysis, Planning and M&E as related and mutually reinforcing processes. Challenges faced by the Analysis, Planning and M&E cycle inherent in FCAS contexts can be mitigated. Measuring progress requires clear goals based on an accurate baseline assessment, and a conflict analysis that directly feeds into the strategic planning process and is regularly updated. This progression is an effective means to re-align resources and priorities as well as

reduce the possibility for unintended negative consequences if used as part of a continual feedback loop during programme implementation. Officials engaging in interventions in FCAS (both short-term stabilisation and for the longer term) should therefore make efforts to ensure sufficient investment in Analysis, Planning and M&E processes is available to ensure effective outcomes.

# Annex 1: Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS); The Essentials<sup>12</sup>

## 1. Overview

The Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) is an integrated cross-HMG approach to understanding conflict and stability in fragile countries. Its purpose is to provide a basis to support integrated planning, policy and resource allocation, creating synergy between the UK's diplomatic, development and defence analytical processes. It can be applied equally in contexts that are in active conflict, are post conflict, or are fragile but currently peaceful.

## 2. Approach

The JACS is an approach (or process) – not a pre-defined product. As such, it can be applied to provide a *generic* understanding of conflict and stability in a given context, or to explore a *specific aspect* of that context (for example, cross border issues, drivers of radicalisation, etc.). What is key is that it answers a clearly-defined question or set of questions, agreed cross-departmentally, that will inform future decision-making on resourcing and policy issues. The process can be light touch or in-depth, depending on available timescales and customer needs, and is focused at the strategic level.

The approach is based on three phases:

- Phase 1 - Initiation  
Reviewing what is already known, establishing objectives and agreeing the timing and the scope of the study (terms of reference).
- Phase 2 - Analysis  
Desk and field studies, examining causes, actors and dynamics of conflict, sources of institutional resilience and other opportunities for peace. Identifies other external interventions and provides recommendations for HMG action.
- Phase 3 – Deployment or Utilisation  
Focuses on the utilisation of analysis. Aims to ensure that the findings of analysis inform subsequent UK government policy and action.

## 3. Principles

A JACS process must observe the following basic principles;

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<sup>12</sup> This short introductory note has been prepared by the Stabilisation Unit. A more detailed JACS Guidance Note is available for HMG IT users on the cross-Government platform, Collaborate.

- i. Commissioned tri-departmentally at a senior level (three Heads of the country team, or London based Directors).
- ii. Commissioned with a clear policy or resource-related objective.
- iii. Carried out and overseen cross-departmentally. A cross-departmental oversight team must be established to take the key decisions, including on ToRs and key conclusions. Must include members of FCO, DFID and MOD, plus ideally the Cabinet Office (and others, as appropriate).
- iv. Meets minimum levels of quality control. A JACS must cover the core essentials of the analysis model: causes, actors, dynamics and triggers, opportunities for peace and institutional resilience. Consultants can play a valuable role, but leadership and majority analysis should be by HMG staff.
- v. Based on all available source material - both HMG and external. (Note; the aim should be to maintain the security classification as low as is practical).
- vi. Receives sign-off by those who commissioned it.
- vii. Alignment with wider UK policies and strategies must be considered.
- viii. Conflict sensitivity ensured. Consider safety, security and well-being of stakeholders consulted. Ensure research and analysis approach does not exacerbate conflict (*do no harm*).

#### **4. Support and Resources**

The cross-Government 'hub' for providing advice and support to those considering or undertaking a JACS is the Stabilisation Unit.

All completed JACS, the JACS Guidance Note and other useful resources and links can be found on the JACS Community Website, hosted on the cross-Government platform, Collaborate.

## Annex 2: Civilian and Military Equivalent Terminology

Civilian Terminology	Military Terminology
Analysis	Analysis/Estimate/Assessment
Benchmarks	Thresholds
Beneficiaries	Recipients
Context	Situational Awareness
Drivers and Spoilers	Centre of Gravity
Evaluation	Assessment
Implementation Plan/Action Plan	Operational Plan
Indicators	Measurements
Intended Consequences	Supporting Effects
Monitoring	Assessment
Outcome/Impact	Measurement of Effect
Output against Objectives	Measurement of Activity
Plan or Strategy	Campaign
Programme Development	Course of Action Development
Resource Allocation	Course of Action Application
Short-term Objectives	Time Sensitive Targets